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“We know we belong to the Land, And the Land we belong to is
grand!”
– Lyrics from “Oklahoma!” by Oscar Hammerstein1
These are certainly interesting political times. There have been sharp shifts
in voter sentiment in the last several national elections. 2 In 2000, Al Gore
secured the popular vote, but George W. Bush won the electoral vote with some
help from the U.S. Supreme Court.3 President Bush’s reelection in 2004 ushered
in what promised to be the strongest Republican presidency since Ronald
Reagan, given that the Republican Party controlled both Houses in Congress.4
However, in 2006, after military setbacks in Iraq and natural disasters at home,
the party that seemed ascendant two years before lost Congress to the Democrats
in an election widely viewed as a rebuke of Bush Administration policies.5
Subsequently, in 2008, the Democrats captured the White House and
strengthened their congressional majorities, providing them control of both the
Executive and Legislative Branches for the first time in close to a generation.6
Pundits predicted a new era of progressive lawmaking.7 Yet, just two years later,
1. OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN & RICHARD RODGERS, OKLAHOMA! 58, Act 2, Scene 4 (1943).
2. See infra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
3. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (deciding the results of the 2000 Presidential
election in Florida after a contentious recount, which in turn determined the national result); see
also John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Election of 2000, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2000 (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
4. See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/PartyDivisions/Party-Divisions/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Party Divisions: House of
Representatives]; see also Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, UNITED STATES SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Party Division:
Senate]; John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Election of 2004, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2004 (last visited Mar. 8,
2016).
5. In 2006, a midterm election, the Republican Party lost control of both houses of Congress
to the Democratic Party. See Bart Mongoven, The Political Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
STRATFOR (Aug. 29, 2007), https://www.stratfor.com/political_aftermath_hurricane_katrina; see
also Party Divisions: House of Representatives, supra note 4; Party Division: Senate, supra note
4.
6. See John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Election of 2008, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=2008 (last visited Mar. 8, 2016)
(noting that in 2008, a presidential election year, the Democratic Party’s candidate, Barack Obama,
was elected President); see also Party Divisions: House of Representatives, supra note 4; see also
Party Division: Senate, supra note 4.
7. Reaching for a New Deal: President Obama’s Agenda and the Dynamics of U.S. Politics,
RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, http://www.russellsage.org/research/reaching-for-new-deal-readmore (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (“Pundits and politicians alike have compared Barack Obama’s
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in 2010, the Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives.8 Although
President Barack Obama was re-elected in 2012, Republicans strengthened their
control over the House of Representatives and executed effective political
blocking power in the Senate.9 The Republicans regained control of the Senate
in 2014, making it even more difficult for the Obama Administration to fulfill
new legislatives initiatives.10 The overall effect was years of federal political
stalemate between the Democratic and Republican Parties. 11 Evidently, the
political symbol that best captures the electoral mood of the public in the United
States is neither a red elephant nor a blue donkey (the symbols of the Republican
and Democratic Parties, respectively), but rather a red-and-blue yo-yo.
Amid these national political tremors, one of the more obscure, yet potentially
legally significant, developments of the 2010 midterm election occurred in
Oklahoma. 12 In a statewide referendum, voters approved a change to the
Oklahoma state constitution, adopting restrictions on state judges which have
subsequently been enacted in other states and could play a significant role for
U.S. law in the future.13 Dubbed the “Save Our State” (“SOS”) Amendment,
the measure forbade Oklahoma state judges from considering or using
ambitious policy initiatives to Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, which sought to alleviate the
economic devastation of the Great Depression.”).
8. See Party Divisions: House of Representatives, supra note 4.
9. See id. (highlighting that in 2010, during President Obama’s first term, the Democrats lost
control of the House of Representatives); see also John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Election of
2012, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.
php?year=2012 (last visited Mar. 8, 2016); Party Division: Senate, supra note 4.
10. See Senate Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014, 12:28 PM),
http://elections.nytimes.com/2014/results/senate; see also Jon Gregory, The Impact of U.S.
Political Change is More than Domestic, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://www.diplomaticourier.com/the-impact-of-u-s-political-change-is-more-than-domestic/.
11. See, e.g., Dawson Church, Gridlockracy • [grid-lok-ruh-see] • noun, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 8, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dawson-church/gridlockracygridlokruhse_b_6281362.html.
12. See infra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
13. Ben Armbruster, Sharia Hysteria Comes to Oklahoma: Voters Approve Sharia Law Ban,
THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 3, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2010/11/03/
128074/oklahoma-sharia-law/; see OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Many states in the United States
authorize the amendment of state constitutions through a process of electoral referendum. See
David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process,
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 13 (1995). The author discusses the initiative and referendum process:
The initiative and popular referendum permit citizens to set the political agenda by
placing statutes and constitutional amendments on the ballot . . . Using the initiative,
voters may write statutes, and in some states constitutional amendments, which will go to
the ballot if sufficient valid petition signatures are gathered. Initiative sponsors in states
that provide both the constitutional and statutory initiative will often submit their measure
as a constitutional initiative because of its “more secure” legal standing, a trend that is
growing in at least one state. Constitutional initiatives can typically be changed only by
a subsequent vote of the people, although statutory initiatives in most states may be
amended by the legislature.
Id.
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international or foreign law, except where required to do so by federal statutes
or treaties.14 The measure specifically prohibited any reliance on Sharia, the
term popularly applied to Islamic law derived from the Quran and the law of
predominantly Muslim nations. 15 This specific limitation enabled the SOS
Amendment supporters to tap into the anti-Muslim sentiment that has been an
undercurrent in U.S. society since the attacks of September 11, 2001,16 but the
anti-Muslim stance of the SOS Amendment also opened it to constitutional
challenge in federal court under the Establishment Clause.17
The Amendment did not respond to any particular developments in the
Oklahoma courts. Rather, supporters described the Amendment as a preemptive measure intended to forestall trouble. 18 Prior to the vote, the preemptive measure attracted little media attention and failed to spark significant

14. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010). The Oklahoma state
constitutional amendment read as follows:
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising their judicial
authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United
States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial
decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions
of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not
limited to, cases of first impression.
Id.
15. Id. (“The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.”).
16. See Roger Cohen, Shariah at the Kumback Café, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/opinion/07iht-edcohen.html (characterizing Sharia as “the
new hot-button wedge issue, as radicalizing as abortion or gay marriage, seized on by Republicans
to mobilize conservative Americans against the supposed ‘stealth jihad’ of Muslims in the United
States and against a Democratic president portrayed as oblivious to — or complicit with — the
threat”); Carey Gillam, Oklahoma Judge Blocks Anti-Islam Amendment, REUTERS (Nov. 30, 2010,
8:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/30/us-oklahoma-ruling-idUSTRE6AT2CK
20101130 (stating opponents of the law argued “it clearly was a discriminatory measure” against
Muslims); Newt Gingrich, No Mosque at Ground Zero, HUMAN EVENTS (July 28, 2010, 3:01 AM),
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38282 (“[T]he radical Islamist effort to impose sharia
worldwide is a direct threat to all those who believe in the freedoms maintained by our constitutional
system.”).
17. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (challenging the
constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute).
18. See Joel Siegel, Islamic Sharia Law to Be Banned in, ah, Oklahoma, ABC NEWS (June
14, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/Media/oklahoma-pass-laws-prohibiting-islamic-sharia-lawsapply/story?id=10908521 (quoting State Representative Rex Duncan, a “chief architect of the
measure,” as describing the amendment as “a necessary ‘preemptive strike’ against Islamic law
coming to the state” and adding that he “‘see[s] this in the future somewhere in America . . . [i]t’s
not an imminent threat in Oklahoma yet, but it’s a storm on the horizon in other states.’”).
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local controversy.19 Instead of addressing pressing state government issues, the
amendment appeared to have been advanced in part as a means of generating
conservative voter turnout in what otherwise could have been a dull midterm
election.20 No matter what the political calculus may have been, the Amendment
passed with over 70% of voter support. 21 The Amendment would not have
affected the outcome in any pending litigation. 22 Yet, had the Amendment
survived scrutiny in federal court, it could have fundamentally altered the
structural fabric of judicial decision-making in the Sooner State.
The SOS Amendment failed to take effect because it was immediately
challenged in federal court on the grounds that, by singling out Sharia for
specific prohibition, it violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.23 In Awad v. Ziriax,24 the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the SOS Amendment,
concluding that there was a substantial likelihood the challengers could prove it
violated the Establishment Clause.25 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit upheld the injunction, and the matter was remanded to the
district court for further proceedings.26 In August 2013, the district court entered
a final injunction permanently enjoining the Amendment.27 In anticipation that
the Amendment might be enjoined, the Oklahoma Legislature passed a bill that
re-enacted the limitations by statute without the specific reference to Sharia.28
The constitutionality of that backup measure remains unchallenged.29
Even if the SOS Amendment had survived the constitutional challenge, it
likely would have had minimal immediate impact on legal decisions in
Oklahoma courts. There was no evidence that Oklahoma judges frequently, or
even occasionally, turned to foreign or international law in their judgments
before the Amendment was adopted, and the Amendment was unlikely to alter

19. See Armbruster, supra note 13; but cf. Dick Polman, From Paranoia to Patdowns,
NEWSWORKS (Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php?option=com_flexicontent&
view=items&id=8547:from-paranoia-to-patdowns.
20. See Polman, supra note 19 (stating that the Oklahoma “Save Our State” Amendment “did
what it was supposed to do” in “boost[ing] conservative turnout” with such success that
“Republicans are thinking of pushing similar ballot measures in other states.”).
21. Summary Results: General Election–November 2, 2010, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD.
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html.
22. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 18 (noting that experts in the legal field were not aware of a
United States judge invoking Sharia law to render a decision).
23. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. at 1301–02.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1306, 1308.
26. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1133 (10th Cir. 2012).
27. Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
28. See H.B. 1060, 2013 Leg., 54th Sess. (Okla. 2013).
29. See Bill Information for HB 1060, OKLAHOMA STATE LEGISLATURE,
http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb1060&Session=1300 (last visited Mar. 8,
2016).
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judicial behavior or outcomes in any existing cases.30 Moreover, the Amendment
specifically permitted reference to foreign and international materials in the
application of federal law. It can be inferred that this exception was an attempt
to avoid federal preemption.31 Consequently, the Oklahoma Amendment was
more symbolic than substantive at the time of its enactment, although that
probably would have changed over time.32
To regard the pre-emptive measure as either a simple political maneuver or a
symbolic swipe at Islam would miss its deeper significance. The measure
reflects a substantial wave of antipathy in the United States to foreign and
international law, particularly in the nation’s politically and socially
conservative jurisdictions.33 The SOS Amendment tapped into a widely held
public sentiment that there is something fundamentally, and perhaps even
dangerously, wrong in allowing U.S. courts to consider the laws of other nations,
utilize the work of other courts around the world, or incorporate principles of
international law into the reasoning and judgments of courts in the United
States.34
Subsequent events have demonstrated that what happened in Oklahoma in
2010 was not an isolated phenomenon. Similar measures (usually without
specific references to Sharia) have been proposed or adopted elsewhere.35 The
30. See, e.g., Michael Gerson, Baiting a Faith in Oklahoma, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/15/AR2010111506766_pf.html.
31. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010). Under the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, the laws of states, including state constitutions, are preempted if they conflict
with national law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 551 (2001) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted
Massachusetts’ regulations restricting tobacco companies’ outdoor and point-of-sale advertising);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72–74 (1941) (holding that the Alien Registration Act of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was preempted by the federal Alien Registration Act enacted by
Congress). To avoid this fate, the “SOS Amendment” effectively permits an exception for instances
in which state judges must apply federal law. See Okla. H.R.J. Res. 1056.
32. See Gerson, supra note 30 (characterizing the “SOS Amendment” as “a novel use of
American law — not to actually address a public problem but to taunt a religious minority.”).
33. See, e.g., Editorial, A Respect for World Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/opinion/03tue3.html?_r=0?register=facebook.
34. See id. (endorsing Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s defense of the value of
foreign law, despite the rampant “[n]ativism in American politics[,]” as “‘add[ing] to the store of
knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions’”); see Richard Geldard, The Rise of
American
Exceptionalism, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22,
2012,
5:12
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
richard-geldard/the-rise-of-United States-exce_b_1103875.html; see also Stephen M. Walt, The
Myth of American Exceptionalism, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism. See generally Robert R. Tomes,
United States Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century, 56 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. &
STRATEGY 27 (2014).
35. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 57, 82d Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2011); S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 1004, 2011
Leg. Assemb., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011); see also Sara Prasatik, Assessing the Viability of State
International Law Prohibitions, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 465, 465–66 (2013); Jeremy Grunert,
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constitutional amendment in Oklahoma has been followed by the enactment or
consideration of similar measures in other states, including Arizona, Florida,
Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Wyoming. 36 Several public interest
groups are actively pressing Congress 37 for comparable legislative proposals
directed at the federal courts.38 This article will refer to these measures as “AntiForeign-or-International-Law” (“AFIL”) statutes and proposals.39 In the new
era of conservative political backlash against what many voters see as liberal
excess on all fronts, the claim that “liberal” courts are endangering cherished
U.S. legal values by indulging a recently discovered penchant for reliance on

Comment, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia? Awad v. Ziriax and the Question of Sharia
Law in America, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 695, 698–99 (2013).
36. Other states have dropped the specific reference to Sharia. They have also generalized
the AFIL disability to apply to laws from any nation that lacks U.S. federal and state commitments
to fundamental rights. Because there are few nations in the world, however, that have precisely the
array and extent of rights that exist in the United States, this formula actually invites wholesale
prescription of the vast majority of foreign law. See S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2011); S.B. 58, 2013 Leg., 155th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 79, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan.
2012); H.B. 785, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010); H.B. 695, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2013); H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); see generally FAIZA PATEL ET AL., CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., FOREIGN LAW BANS: LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES
AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 1–4 (2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
publications/ForeignLawBans.pdf (discussing AFIL statutes in various jurisdictions and
identifying differences in statutory and constitutional language).
37. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Freedom L. Ctr., “American Laws for American Courts”
Public Policy Initiative Advances in State Legislatures as AFLC Leads Citizens Awareness Drive
(Jun. 26, 2013), http://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/press-release/american-laws-foramerican-courts-public-policy-initiative-advances-in-state-legislatures-as-aflc-leads-citizensawareness-drive/; see also American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE,
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2016); e.g., American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign
Laws—Including Shariah, ACT! FOR AM. (May 29, 2014, 3:36 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/
20140828191627/http://www.actforamerica.org/index.php/learn/email-archives/3081-american-lawsfor-american-courts-protects-constitutional-rights-against-foreign-laws-including-shariah; Confronting
the Threat of Radical Islam, THOMAS MORE L. CTR., https://www.thomasmore.org/key_issue
/confronting-the-threat-islam/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016); SANE Special Update: Material Support
of Jihad Statute in Tennessee, SOC’Y OF AM. FOR NAT’L EXISTENCE (Mar. 1, 2011, 9:04 AM),
http://www.saneworks.us/indexnew.php; CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN
STATE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STATE APPELLATE CASES 1 (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2012/08/30/shariah-law-and-american-state-courts/.
38. See, e.g., H.R. 973, 112th Cong. (2011).
Part VI of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:‘In
any court created by or under article III of the Constitution of the United States, no justice,
judge, or other judicial official shall decide any issue in a case before that court in whole
or in part on the authority of foreign law, except to the extent the Constitution or an Act
of Congress requires the consideration of that foreign law.’
Id. at § 1.
39. Note also that the Islamic law of Sharia has several appropriate spellings, including
“shariah” “shari’ah” or “shari’a”. For the purposes of consistency, this article will uniformly use
the spelling “sharia.”
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foreign law has struck a responsive chord with the U.S. public.40 Antipathy to
foreign law on the political front has, no doubt, been further aggravated by recent
Supreme Court decisions that have looked beyond the borders of the United
States in either limiting the scope of the death penalty 41 or expanding gay
rights.42 The AFIL proposals and measures tap into that antipathy as well.
Antipathy to foreign law has had a noteworthy effect on the federal judicial
appointment process.43 The last four Supreme Court nominees were closely
interrogated by Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
regarding their personal views on the use of foreign and international law in the
adjudication of domestic legal questions.44 Four Supreme Court Justices have
40. See, e.g., American Laws for American Courts, supra note 37; see also CTR. FOR SEC.
POL’Y, supra note 37, at 1.
41. Graham v. Florida., 560 U.S. 48, 81–82 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a life sentence without parole for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide,
observing that, although international law is not dispositive for interpretations of the Eighth
Amendment, “‘the overwhelming weight of international opinion against’ life without parole for
non[-]homicide offenses committed by juveniles ‘provide[s] respected and significant confirmation
for our own conclusions’”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (stating that “[t]he
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty is not controlling
here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the Court’s determination that the
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18[,]” to support the Court’s holding
that execution of individuals under 18 at the time of their crimes is constitutionally prohibited).
42. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73, 576–77 (2003) (citing decisions by the
European Court of Human Rights and other nations as evidence that the right of homosexuals to
engage in consensual intimate activities is “an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries[,]” in support of its decision to declare a Texas statute unconstitutional that made it a crime
for two people of the same sex to engage in consensual sexual acts).
43. See Thomas C. Goldstein & Cody S. Harris, Outsourcing American Law: Foreign Law
and Constitutional Interpretation: The Debate Behind Diatribes 8, 24 (Am. Enter. Inst. For Pub.
Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 157, 2011), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/
11/20090820-Chapter7.pdf; see also David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial
Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2008) (highlighting that Justice Kennedy was a
disappointment for conservatives because he “cite[d] foreign law when it supported his views”).
44. Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 557-58
(2007).
Bush’s eventual nominees, Judges John Roberts and Samuel Alito, both faced close
questioning from the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding their views on the Court’s
use of foreign constitutional precedent. Both nominees registered opposition to the use
of such precedent, although they stopped short of saying that other members of the Court
should be prevented from doing so.
Id. at 558.
During their confirmation hearings, Supreme Court nominees John Roberts and Samuel
Alito expressed their firm opposition to the interpretive approach. Original leaders of the
movement now sound more defensive than ever, as demonstrated by Justice John Paul
Stevens’s statement from the bench conceding that, ‘I know it is not popular to refer to
international commentary on issues like this . . . .’
Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts and Constitutional Comparativism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 649
(2008); see also The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 125–27 (2010)
(statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley); Adam Liptak, Analysis: Sotomayor on Foreign Law, N.Y.
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openly opposed the use of foreign or international precedent in U.S.
constitutional decisions.45 Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito
both spoke against the practice, 46 and Justice Clarence Thomas and former
Justice Antonin Scalia registered their opposition in various Supreme Court
opinions. 47 Prior to taking her seat on the Supreme Court, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, then a federal circuit court judge, wrote and spoke in favor of a more
active judicial consideration of foreign and international sources.48 However,
Justice Sotomayor backtracked somewhat in her confirmation hearings by recharacterizing her position and offering assurances that decisions in foreign
courts would not influence her legal decisions.49 Justice Elena Kagan, whose

TIMES (Jul. 17, 2009, 10:56 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/analysis-sotomayoron-foreign-law/.
45. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected
out of hand. In fact the Court itself does not believe it. In many significant respects the
laws of most other countries differ from our law—including not only such explicit
provisions of our Constitution as the right to jury trial and grand jury indictment, but even
many interpretations of the Constitution prescribed by this Court itself.
Id.; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of these foreign
views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy)
is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . . should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’” (quoting Foster v. Fla., 537 U.S. 990, n.* (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of cert.))); Rahdert, supra note 44, at 558.
46. Rahdert, supra note 44, at 558. (“Both nominees probably needed to oppose the use of
foreign precedent in order to win the support of some of the Judiciary Committee’s more
conservative members, including Senators John Cornyn and Jon Kyl.”).
47. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of cert.).
48. Sonia Sotomayor, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, How
Federal Judges Look to International and Foreign Law Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, Speech
Before the American Civil Liberties Union of Puerto Rico (Apr. 28, 2009), Speech to the A.C.L.U.
of Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/
1194840839480/speech-to-the-a-c-l-u-of-puertorico.html.
To the extent that we as a country remain committed to the concept that we have freedom
of speech, we must have freedom of ideas. And to the extent that we have freedom of
ideas, international law and foreign law will be very important in the discussion of how
to think about the unsettled issues in our own legal system. It is my hope that judges
everywhere will continue to do this, because I personally believe that it is part of our
obligation to think about things not outside of the American legal system, but that within
the American legal system we’re commanded to interpret our law in the best way we can,
and that means looking to what anyone has said to see if it has persuasive value.
Id.
49. See The Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 132–33, 348–49
(2009) (statements of Sen. Thomas Coburn, Sen. Charles Schumer, and Judge Sonia Sotomayor);
see also Liptak, supra note 44 (“Judge Sotomayor, judging by her statements at her confirmation
hearings this week, is not willing to let foreign courts play a dispositive role in her decision-making.
Nor is she prepared, as her two predecessors seemed to be, to close her ears entirely.”).
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career path involved a long stint as a legal scholar and educator,50 was able to
describe her interest in foreign law as motivated primarily by intellectual
curiosity.51 Neither Justice Sotomayor’s nor Justice Kagan’s confirmation was
placed at risk by their testimony, but many Senators who voted against
confirmation cited the Justices’ interest in foreign law (and the Senators’
suspicions about what role it might play in their decisions) as one reason for their
negative vote. 52 It will be interesting to observe what role attitudes toward
foreign and international law may play in confirmation hearings for Justice
Antonin Scalia’s successor.
The Supreme Court nominations are the tip of a much larger judicial
appointment and electoral iceberg. For other federal court nominations, state
court nominations, and judicial elections in states where judges are elected,53
50. Most notably, Justice Kagan served as Dean of Harvard Law School from 2003-2009.
Deans of Harvard Law School, HARV. LAW SCHOOL, http://hls.harvard.edu/library/historicalspecial-collections/research-assistance/deans-of-harvard-law-school/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
51. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 126 (2010) (statements
of Sen. Charles Grassley and Elena Kagan, Solicitor General, nominated to be an Associate Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court) In an exchange, Senator Grassley asked “Should judges ever look to
foreign law for ‘good ideas?’ Should they get inspiration for their decisions from foreign law?”
Solicitor General Kagan responded:
Well, Senator Grassley, I guess I’m in favor of good ideas coming from wherever you
can get them, so in that sense I think for a judge to read a law review article or to read a
book about legal issues or to read the decision of a state court, even though there’s no
binding effect of that state court, or to read the decision of a foreign court, to the extent
that you learn about how different people might approach and have thought about
approaching legal issues.
Id.
52. See Press Release, Ga. Sen. Saxby Chambliss, Chambliss Statement on Judge Sotomayor
(Jul. 30, 2009), http://votesmart.org/public-statement/446021/chambliss-statement-on-judgesotomayor#.Vui5Rcc-CT- (“I am concerned about her apparent leaning to use foreign law to
interpret America’s own laws and Constitution.”); see also Press Release, Idaho Sen. James E.
Risch, Statement on Opposition to Supreme Court Nominee Sonia Sotomayor (Jul. 27, 2009),
http://www.risch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=eeb421d2-91ac-4f1c-b48351da546a0bf2 (“Her answers to questions on the use of foreign law to interpret our Constitution did
nothing to ease my concern that she would not look to the laws of other countries when interpreting
the Constitution. That should not happen under any circumstance.”); Press Release, Iowa Sen.
Chuck Grassley, Senator Grassley’s Statement for Judiciary Committee Exec. on Elena Kagan to
be an Associate Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court (Jul. 20, 2010), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/
news/news-releases/senator-grassleys-statement-judiciary-committee-exec-elena-kagan-beassociate.
Solicitor General Kagan also stated that a Justice could look to international law to find
“good ideas” when interpreting the Constitution and U.S. laws. I’m unaware how
international law can help us better understand the Constitution. When we begin to look
to international law to interpret our own Constitution, we are at a point where the meaning
of the United States Constitution is no longer determined by the American people.
Id.
53. See Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 181 (2004).
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any hint of affinity for foreign or international law could lead to disaster for a
potential judicial nominee or candidate.54 As the world of U.S. judicial politics
becomes increasingly divided and contested, with state election costs now
running in the millions of dollars, the opposition will exploit the issue as an
opportunity to create resistance to any candidate who even hints at an interest in
foreign or international law.55
Collectively, these developments reflect a vigorous new strain of a deepseated tendency in the political, legal, and cultural thought of the United States:
a commitment to U.S. national “exceptionalism.”56 There are several theoretical
arguments that have been advanced in academic circles against the use of foreign
and international law by U.S. courts. These arguments include claims that
resorting to foreign law conflicts with the Framers’ original intentions in
constitutional matters, delegates judicial authority to foreign powers, compounds
the democratic deficit of judicial decision-making, creates selectively resultoriented decisions, and is impracticable.57 Some of the voters who passed the
The vast majority of judicial offices in the United States are subject to election. The votes
of the people select or retain at least some judges in thirty-nine states, and all judges are
elected in twenty-one states. By one count, 87% of the state and local judges in the
United States have to face the voters at some point if they want to win or remain in office.
Id.; Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 623 (2009)
(“[M]ore than 90 percent of the United States’ judicial business is handled by state courts, and
approximately nine in ten of all state court judges face the voters in some type of election.”).
54. See generally Martha F. Davis, Shadow and Substance: The Impacts of the AntiInternational Law Debate on State Court Judges, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 631, 644–45 (2013)
(discussing tendency of state judges to avoid discussion or application of foreign law even when
permitted to do so as a result of AFIL movement).
55. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077,
1081 (2007) (“Judicial elections have become nastier, noisier, and costlier. Indeed, the rise in cost
and heat is so well-known that it has become a stuck record.”); see also Davis, supra note 54, at
646; Shepherd, supra note 53, at 642.
The cost of [state] supreme court campaigns, especially in partisan elections, has risen so
dramatically that it is often difficult, if not impossible, for candidates to win elections
without substantial funding. In 1997–1998, the top campaign fundraiser prevailed in
approximately 75 percent of contested state supreme court races, and in 2001–2002, the
top fundraiser won in 80 percent of the elections. Thus, with few exceptions, more money
is a prelude to victory.
Id. (citation omitted).
56. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE INTELLECTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA:
EXCEPTIONALISM AND IDENTITY FROM 1492 TO 1800 4–7 (1993); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET,
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 33–35 (1996); DEBORAH L. MADSEN,
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 35–38 (1998); Dorothy Ross, American Exceptionalism, in A
COMPANION TO AMERICAN THOUGHT 22–23 (Richard Wightman Fox & James T. Kloppenberg
eds., 1995); Michael Kammen, The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration, 45
AM. Q. 1, 6–11 (1993).
57. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 89 (2005) (“Yet the judicial systems of the United States are relatively
uniform and their product readily accessible, while the judicial systems of the world are immensely
varied and most of their decisions inaccessible as a practical matter to our mostly monolingual
judges and law clerks.”); see also Rahdert, supra note 44, at 584, 635–55.
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Oklahoma referendum and some of the legislators voting for similar laws in
other states may have entertained some or all of these views.58 But aside from
specific antipathy to Islamic law, the single argument that strongly resonates
with public sentiment is the idea that U.S. law is so vitally different from law
elsewhere in the world that any use of foreign or international sources in legal
adjudication risks corrupting U.S. justice and is a betrayal of fundamental U.S.
legal values.59
In the United States, exceptionalist thinking is very much a part of the
prevailing national narrative, and it has been since the nation’s founding. 60
Exceptionalists view the U.S. national experience as unique and superior in ways
that have translated directly into U.S. legal culture. Citizens of the U.S.
recognize the Declaration of Independence, and the American Revolution it
sought to justify, as formidable embodiments of our national uniqueness. 61
These citizens also believe that unique character is expressed in our national
Constitution, 62 which many exceptionalists treat as a sacred text that
encompasses a national political faith and hallowed political institutions infused
with national culture.63 This attitude carries over to several facets of the U.S.

58. See James C. McKinley, Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/us/15oklahoma.html?_r=0 (highlighting
that the Oklahoma amendment passed with an overwhelming voter approval by seventy percent
and State Representative Rex Duncan “predicted that Muslims would come to America to take
away ‘the liberties and freedom from our children’”); see also Steve Benen, Oklahoma Bar
Imaginary Sharia Threat, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/
archives/individual/2010_11/026460.php (noting that legislators intended the amendment “to
prevent ‘liberal judges’ who want to ‘undermine those founding principles’ of America”).
59. See Rahdert, supra note 44, at 592 (finding that exceptionalists regard the “Constitution
as unique among world organs of government[,]” and thus believe that foreign law should be
irrelevant because the Constitution was designed to be different).
60. Id. at 590, 592.
Accompanying that physical isolation was the national sentiment of uniqueness. For
example, American cultural tradition is closely associated with such icons as the pioneer
spirit, manifest destiny, and the metaphor of the United States as a moral and political
‘beacon on a hill,’ committed to the development of a transformed society fundamentally
different in character from its European forebears.
Id. at 590 (citation omitted); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1479, 1481 n.4 (2003) (“The term ‘American Exceptionalism,’ said to have been coined by Alexis
de Tocqueville in 1831, has historically referred to the perception that the United States differs
qualitatively from other developed nations, because of its unique origins, national credo, historical
evolution, and distinctive political and religious institutions.”).
61. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); Constitutional Supremacy and
American Exceptionalism, SELOUS FOUND. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., http://sfppr.org/constitutionalsupremacy-and-american-exceptionalism/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
62. See, e.g., Constitutional Supremacy and American Exceptionalism, supra note 61
(providing an argument linking the Constitution with American exceptionalism and using the
linkage to argue against use of foreign law in American courts).
63. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 200–
01 (1913).

2016]

Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law

549

legal system. We see ourselves as a nation apart from European culture and
history—which we broke away from over 225 years ago by declaring and
achieving independence—and from other nations that are legally, culturally, and
politically separate.64 Citizens of the United States regard the U.S. Constitution
and laws as potent reflections of our fundamental difference from all foreign
nations.65 Consequently, average voters in the U.S., and no doubt typical state
legislators as well, have an immediate, obvious, intuitive, and almost reflexive
answer to the question of whether U.S. courts should look to foreign or
international law when rendering their judgments. The answer is a resounding
“No,” across the board, with no exceptions.
This article examines the idea of U.S. legal exceptionalism in the context of
the recent wave of state AFIL laws. Part I begins with Oklahoma’s law and a
discussion of the constitutional litigation in Awad. This case primarily concerns
federal constitutional principles on the separation of church and state. However,
in applying those principles, Awad addresses a broader question: whether
religiously motivated strains of exceptionalist beliefs are constitutionally
permissible.66 The courts have thus far held that such selective religious legal
exceptionalism is constitutionally prohibited.67 This Article agrees. It maintains
that Oklahoma’s attempt to single out Islamic law for particular disapprobation
represents a rare example of a constitutionally forbidden explicit governmental
religious preference. Although the constitutional question is considerably closer,
the Article also argues that evidence of an underlying anti-religious sentiment
ought to defeat the constitutionality of any AFIL proposal that is directed at the
particular exclusion of Islamic law, even if the state statute or constitutional
amendment uses neutral wording.
Part II turns attention to religiously neutral and thoroughly secular state laws
that broadly prohibit judicial consideration of foreign or international principles
of law without regard to their origin. It is possible that such a studiously neutral
law, which is not directed against Islam or any other religious faith, would
survive constitutional review. Yet although such wholesale exceptionalism may
The document which the convention presented to congress and to the country as the
proposed new constitution for the United States was a surprise to everybody. No one
could have foreseen the processes by which it had been constructed, and no one could
have foretold the compromises by which the differences of opinion had been reconciled,
and accordingly no one could have forecast the result.
Id.; see CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 278–81(1966).
64. See Rahdert, supra note 44, at 592–95 (arguing that the world watched the experiment of
the U.S. Constitution as it “broke new ground in world political history” and departed from
European influence).
65. Id. at 592 (stressing that the “Americans regard the United States as fundamentally
different from all other nations; they also regard the Constitution as unique among world organs of
government.”).
66. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2012).
67. See infra Part I.
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avoid the restrictions of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, it is
nonetheless unwise and contrary to long-established U.S. legal tradition.
Because existing legal doctrines carefully regulate the operation of foreign or
international law in domestic adjudication, U.S. exceptionalism is unnecessary.
It is also unworkable, undesirable, and probably unenforceable in an
increasingly globalized legal world.
Wholesale exceptionalism contradicts the longstanding tradition that state
courts are afforded the general authority to decide all legal issues within the
courts’ jurisdiction, regardless of the law’s source.68 It is unworkable because
globalization has increasingly intertwined foreign and domestic legal issues,
leaving the lines between nations progressively more indistinct. It is
unenforceable because courts and counsel can find ways to informally bring
foreign or international law into the courtroom. It is unwise because it
contravenes important strains of comparative thinking in U.S. jurisprudence, and
risks cutting off access to potentially valuable and essential foreign or
international sources. Exceptionalism invites attitudes of isolationism and
nationalism that can lead to pernicious consequences. Finally, it is unnecessary
because U.S. courts are fully capable on their own to sift out the rare
circumstances in which foreign law is properly relevant to a judicial dispute in
the U.S. For all these reasons, courts should have the authority to properly
decide the relevance of foreign and international law in domestic legal disputes
without interference from the state legislatures.
Although wholesale exceptionalism embodied in the current wave of state
AFIL laws should be rejected, foreign or international law should not always be
applied as equally relevant to all legal questions. To the contrary, there are some
areas of U.S. law where exceptional legal experience suffices to warrant
selective exceptionalism that is not based on religious preferences or values. Part
III explores this idea. Comparing and contrasting wholesale and selective
exceptionalism explains why and how selective exceptionalism differs in both
its premises and operation from wholesale exceptionalism. A noteworthy
difference is that selective exceptionalism requires active engagement with
foreign law, while wholesale exceptionalism promotes ignorance of foreign
legal developments.69 There are additional practical and theoretical differences,
which will be identified and explained.
This Article offers preliminary thoughts on the types of U.S. laws that might
support such a selective exceptional approach and establishes some preliminary
criteria that can be used to discern when selective exceptionalist reasoning should
apply. In addition, the Article argues that the proper application of selective
exceptionalism should be left to the courts. The judicial system possesses
reliable means for assessing the applicability of foreign and international law,
which it utilizes with commendable caution. Ironically, one candidate for
68. See Rahdert, supra note 44, at 641.
69. See infra Section III.A.
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selective exceptionalism is the U.S. legal tradition of separation between church
and state—the very constitutional issue that defeated the Oklahoma SOS
Amendment in Awad.70
The Article ultimately concludes that the states should resist the temptation to
legislate wholesale exclusion of foreign law from the court system. However
politically attractive it may be, the attempt to ban consideration of all foreign
and international law from U.S. courts serves no useful purpose. It portends
pernicious long-term consequences that undermine the traditional authority of
the courts and the development of justice in the United States.
I. BANNING SHARIA: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON RELIGIOUS
EXCEPTIONALISM
One curious aspect of Oklahoma’s SOS Amendment was that it involved both
wholesale and selective exceptionalism. The selective portion of the
Amendment specifically prohibited consideration of “Sharia,” a term used to
identify the legal tradition that emanates from Islamic religion.71 The Oklahoma
Amendment commanded: “the courts [of Oklahoma] shall not look to the legal
precepts of other nations or cultures.”72 It added: “Specifically, the courts shall
not consider international law or Sharia [l]aw.”73
While the Amendment permitted the courts, “if necessary,” to adhere to “the
law of another state of the United States,” the courts could do so only if “the law
of the other state does not include Sharia [l]aw.”74 The Amendment did not
provide a precise definition of Sharia. 75 However, a “ballot title” that
accompanied the proposed amendment on the ballot explained to voters that the
Amendment “forbid[s] courts from looking at international law or Sharia law,”
by defining it as “Islamic law” emanating from “two principal sources, the
Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”76

70. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1116 (noting that an amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the
advocacy group Americans United for Separation of Church and State in opposition to the
Oklahoma Amendment).
71. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010). See also Carlo A. Pedrioli,
Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law, and the Constitutional Consequences of
Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 65, 66 (2012); Frank Vogel, An
Introduction to Law of the Islamic World, 31 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 353, 356–57 (2003) (defining
broadly Islamic law, including the differentiation between “shariah” and “fiqh” law, as the
governing bodies of the Muslim faith).
72. Okla. H.R.J. Res. 1056.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See generally id. (noting that in the Amendment there is no definition of “Sharia”).
76. Id. For a discussion of the many complex components that enter into the legal tradition of
Sharia, see Samir Islam, Comment, The Negative Effects of Ill-Advised Legislation: The Curious
Case of the Evolution of Anti-Sharia Law Legislation into Anti-Foreign Law Legislation and the
Impact on the CISG, 57 HOW. L.J. 979, 985–89 (2014).
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The proceedings in the district court revealed uncertainty regarding what
would be encompassed within the term “Sharia.” Testimony in district court
established that Sharia is neither a specific set of legal commands, nor a formal
legal code, but instead a flexible legal tradition that connects Muslim religious
teaching to a variety of secular legal practices and obligations. The precise
content can vary from time to time, nation to nation, and culture to culture.77
Nevertheless, the primary goal of the SOS Amendment was fairly clear: if a
particular legal right or duty could be traced to sources of Islamic religious or
legal culture, it must be excluded from consideration in any Oklahoma court
adjudication.78
Since the Amendment did not respond to any particular case or development
in Oklahoma law, it was unclear how a Sharia principle might play a role in an
Oklahoma judicial decision. However, proponents of state AFIL laws have
pointed to decisions in other states that supposedly apply Sharia principles.79
For example, the Center for Security Policy has assembled an “occasional paper”
which identifies approximately 50 cases from various jurisdictions, not
including Oklahoma, that the Center claims involve the application of Sharia
law.80 A majority of the cases concern divorce, custody, or other family law
disputes;81 a few involve property disputes;82 and a handful involve questions of
arbitration or contracts.83 The source for “Sharia” in a small number of cases is
77. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
78. See Grunert, supra note 35, at 701.
79. See CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, supra note 37, at 2.
80. Id. at 1–25.
81. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); In
re the Marriage of Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of
Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841, 843–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 247–
48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 490–91 (Md. 2008); Hosain v. Malik,
671 A.2d 988, 989–90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Tazziz v. Tazziz, 533 N.E.2d 202, 203–04 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1988); Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7,
2009); S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388
A.2d 1000, 1002–03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626, 627 (Va. Ct.
App. 1993); In re Marriage of Obaidi and Qayoum, 226 P.3d 787, 788 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010); In
re Marriage of Donboli, No. 53861-6-I, 2005 WL 1772328, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 18, 2005); In
re Custody of R., 947 P.2d 745, 747 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). For discussion of the potential uses of
Sharia in the family law context, and why they do not threaten basic American legal principles, see
Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Rumors of the Sharia Threat Are Greatly Exaggerated: What American
Judges Really Do with Islamic Family Law in their Courtrooms, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 245, 246–
51 (2013).
82. See, e.g., Nationwide Res. Corp. v. Massabni, 694 P.2d 290, 292–94 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Karson v. Soleimani, Nos. B216360, B219698, 2010 WL 2992071, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
2, 2010).
83. See, e.g., El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 793 (Ark. 2006); Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.
v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochem. Co., Inc., 866 A.2d 1, 6–7 (Del. 2005); Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680
N.W.2d 569, 570–72 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); In re Aramco Services Co., No. 01-09-00624-CV, 2010
WL 1241525, at *1 (Tex. App. Mar. 19, 2010); CPS Int’l, Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 911 S.W.2d.
18, 19 (Tex. App. 1995).
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the law of an Islamic nation that has some contact to the party or dispute.84
However, in a majority of the cases, one party disputed the applicability or
content the opposing party offered to support a claim based on Islamic law or
religion.85
In the overwhelming majority of these cases, the courts found the claim based
on Sharia to be unfounded, inapplicable, or irrelevant.86 In a few instances, a
trial court was temporarily persuaded by the legitimacy of the claim, but its
decision was reversed on appeal in nearly every case.87 If these cases are the
leading evidence of a national trend toward incorporation of Sharia into U.S.
judicial decisions, the Center’s claim of steady infiltration of Islamic law into
U.S. judicial decisions is hardly very compelling. Nevertheless, the mere
assertion of claims based on Islamic law in this small set of recent judicial cases
has been sufficient in some political circles to support of the argument that
Muslim principles are creeping into the fabric of U.S. law.88
Within days after the election in Oklahoma, before the Amendment could be
certified or take effect, the SOS Amendment was challenged in Awad on

84. See, e.g., Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So.2d 75, 77–78 (La. 2001) (involving Egyptian nationals
in child custody proceedings); Charara v. Yatim, 937 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010)
(dealing with the legitimacy of Lebanese divorce proceedings in an American court).
85. See, e.g., Charara, 937 N.E.2d at 493–94.
86. See, e.g., Aleem, 947 A.2d at 502 (finding that Pakistani talaq divorce proceedings under
Sharia law are not sufficient to constitute a divorce in Maryland); Tazziz, 533 N.E.2d at 205–06
(remanding the case to probate court, not to uphold Sharia law, but to determine if the Sharia law
applied by an Israeli court is substantially similar and consistent with Massachusetts law); Abd Alla,
680 N.W.2d at 572 (separating an arbitration claim from Islamic law and limiting the matter to
where jurisdiction is statutorily granted); Farah, 429 S.E.2d at 629–30 (deciding that a common
law marriage was not valid under English law and inconsistent with Virginia law, therefore refusing
to recognize the marriage simply because it took place under Pakistani Sharia law); Donboli, 2005
WL 1772328, at *18 (upholding a trial court decision that the Iranian Civil Code for child custody
is inconsistent with the state of Washington’s public policy).
87. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841, 842–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(reversing a trial court’s non-enforcement of a custody agreement from Lebanon based on Sharia
law); El-Farra, 226 S.W.3d at 794–96 (holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
in reviewing an Islamic minister’s contract claim and declining to apply Islamic ecclesiastical law);
Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *1, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009)
(reversing a trial court decision to uphold an Indian talaq divorce); S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412,
426–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (reversing a trial court’s denial of a restraining order to a
wife based on the fact that marital rape is not a crime under Moroccan Sharia law); In re Marriage
of Obaidi and Qayoum, 226 P.3d 787, 790 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing the trial’s court’s
application of Sharia law in deciding the validity of a mahr contract agreement, in favor of domestic
Washington law).
88. See American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign
Laws—Including Shariah, supra note 37 (advocating for the American Laws in American Courts
models in response to the “infiltration and insinuation” of Sharia law in American courts); see also
American Laws for American Courts Public Policy Initiative Advances in State Legislatures as
AFLC Leads Citizens Awareness Drive, supra note 37 (citing Center for Security Policy paper to
argue that Sharia law is encroaching into American courts).
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constitutional grounds.89 The plaintiff claimed the Amendment denigrated his
Muslim religion.90 He also claimed that the SOS Amendment would interfere
with probation of his will, because his will made specific reference to Islamic
commands regarding charitable bequests to be implemented by his estate.91 The
key question Awad presented was whether the Amendment violated the
Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment by specifically
implementing legal restrictions on Sharia and Islamic law.92 The parties also
vigorously litigated the question of Awad’s standing to raise these claims and
whether the claims satisfied the criteria to grant a preliminary injunction.93
After considering and rejecting challenges to the plaintiff’s standing, 94 the
district and circuit courts focused their analysis on the Establishment Clause.
The two courts disagreed, however, on the controlling legal standards to apply
for the potential Establishment Clause violation.95 The district court utilized the
general establishment test,96 set by Lemon v. Kurtzman.97 Lemon determined
that in order for a statute to meet the requirements of the Establishment Clause
it must: (1) have “a secular legislative purpose”; (2) have a “primary effect” that
“neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) in operation will “not foster . .
. ‘excessive . . . entanglement’” between religion and government.98 Applying
this test, the district court concluded the plaintiff made a “strong showing” that
he would likely succeed in proving that the Oklahoma Amendment violated the
“primary effect” and “entanglement” standards.99
With respect to the primary effect standard, the district court emphasized the
law singled out one particular religion, Islam, and its associated legal tradition,
Sharia, for particular disapprobation:100
While defendants contend that the amendment is merely a choice of
law provision that bans state courts from applying the law of other
nations and cultures, regardless of what faith they may be based on, if
any, the actual language of the amendment reasonably, and perhaps
89. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
90. Id. at 1303.
91. Id. at 1304.
92. Id. at 1305, 1307.
93. Id. at 1302–05.
94. Id. at 1302–06 (Defendants argued that the plaintiff had not suffered “injury in fact”
sufficient to claim standing, maintaining that the plaintiff suffered no actual harm from the “Save
Our State” Amendment. The court rejected this argument and stated the “plaintiff has shown that
he will suffer an injury in fact, specifically, an invasion of his First Amendment rights which is
concrete, particularized and imminent.”); accord Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1120, 1123–28
(10th Cir. 2012).
95. Compare Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–06, with Awad, 670 F.3d at 1126–29.
96. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–06.
97. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
98. Id. at 612–13.
99. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
100. Id.
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more reasonably, may be viewed as specifically singling out Sharia
Law, conveying a message of disapproval of plaintiff’s faith.101
The court reasoned that the Amendment subjected Sharia law to two specific
prohibitions.102 First, the Amendment prohibited any direct consideration of
Sharia by Oklahoma courts. 103 Second, the Amendment prohibited any
incorporation of Sharia through application of law from other states.104 The
court determined that no other religion or religious law was disabled in a similar
manner by the SOS Amendment.105 The consequence was a primary effect of
inhibiting Islam within Oklahoma, and thus a violation of religious neutrality
that the Establishment Clause safeguards.106
The court also found the potential for unconstitutional entanglement. 107
Noting that Sharia is more a flexible and variable tradition than an explicit set of
laws, the court concluded that enforcement of the statute would entail judicial
investigation to determine “the content of Sharia law, and, thus, the content of
[Muslim] religious doctrines.”108 Such an inquiry would “entangle” the courts
by requiring them first to identify, and then specifically to reject, the offending
principles of Islamic law.109 This judicial action would in turn send a negative
message regarding the content of Islam, placing its adherents in a disfavored
position in Oklahoma law and society.110 As a result, the district court concluded
the plaintiff made a “strong showing” that he could prevail on his claim that he
would suffer “irreparable injury” from the Oklahoma Amendment that violated
his constitutional right to freedom of religion. Therefore, his request for a
preliminary injunction was granted.111
The Court of Appeals took a different approach. Although the parties briefed
the case on appeal under the Lemon standard, the court requested supplemental
briefing on whether the strict-scrutiny standard under Larson v. Valente 112
should apply.113 Larson is a fairly unusual Establishment Clause decision. It
concerned a Minnesota charitable solicitation statute that required select
religious groups to register with the Minnesota Department of Commerce.
Registration was based on whether or not the group received more than half of

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1306–07.
Id.
Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1307.
456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128 (10th Cir. 2012).
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its funds “from members or affiliated organizations.”114 Religious groups whose
contributions fell below this “fifty per cent rule” were required to register.115
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded the law effectively exercised a
“denominational preference[]” among religious groups based on their sources of
funding.116 In such a case of denominational discrimination, the Court held,
“our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict
scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.”117 The Court struck the statute down
because although Minnesota could show that protecting against “abusive
practices in the solicitation of funds for charity” was a potentially compelling
secular purpose, the law in question was not “closely fitted” to achieving the
state’s interest.118
In Awad, the Tenth Circuit determined that the Larson standard applied
because the Oklahoma law explicitly singled out Muslim religious beliefs for
negative treatment, thus imposing denominational discrimination.119 The court
rejected Oklahoma’s argument that Sharia was mentioned in the Amendment
merely by way of example, and that all laws from foreign sources, regardless
of religion, would be equally prohibited.120 To the contrary, the court observed
that the Amendment permitted consideration of law from other states, even if
that law included foreign or international principles, unless it relied on Sharia.121
Thus, Islam was singled out because the law did not apply with the same force
to laws derived from any other religious source.122 The court further observed
that domestic sources of law were not excluded from consideration unless they
included principles traceable to Sharia.123 Domestic law drawn from any other
religious source would be permissible. 124 As a result, the Oklahoma
Amendment engaged in a discriminatory denominational preference that was
even more explicit and obvious than the one applied by Minnesota in Larson.125
Since the Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny, it held that Oklahoma must
demonstrate that the Amendment was “closely fitted” to achieve a “compelling”
government interest.126 On this issue, Oklahoma asserted that the law served the
general interest of “‘determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts.’”127

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

456 U.S. at 228.
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 246–47.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 248.
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1128–29.
Id. at 1129.
Id.
Id. at 1128–29.
Id.
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1129.
Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 16, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
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While acknowledging this interest as a “valid state concern,” the court
determined that it was too “general . . . to establish a compelling interest for
purposes of this case.” 128 The court stressed that the compelling interest
standard, at a minimum, required the state to identify an “actual problem” the
statute seeks to address.129 In this situation, no such problem existed, because
there was no evidence that Oklahoma courts were applying Sharia law. 130
Appellants “admitted . . . that they did not know of even a single instance where
an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law or used the legal precepts of other
nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or uses had resulted in
concrete problems in Oklahoma.”131 Consequently, any harm that the law might
address was “speculative at best and cannot support a compelling interest.”132
Additionally, in the absence of a real problem, it was impossible to determine
whether the measure bore a “close fit” to Oklahoma’s interest, because “[o]ne
cannot try on a glove to see if it fits when the glove is missing.”133
Although the absence of a compelling interest was sufficient to defeat the
Amendment, the Tenth Circuit offered “observation[s]” regarding the law’s
tailoring.134 The court observed that the law forbade “‘considering’” foreign law
or principles when the state’s asserted interest would presumably be satisfied by
a narrower provision confined to “‘applying’ Sharia law.” 135 Accordingly,
“[e]ven if the state could identify and support a reason to single out and restrict
Sharia law in its courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly
an exercise of narrow tailoring.”136 Although the court found it unnecessary,
indeed impossible, to rule on this issue given the lack of concrete examples, it
strongly suggested that a total ban on Sharia was likely to be unconstitutionally
over-inclusive.137
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Oklahoma’s SOS Amendment violated
the Establishment Clause was eminently justified. An underlying assumption of
the Amendment was that Islamic law is “foreign,” and therefore not
128. Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1130–31.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1131.
136. Id.
137. Id. On remand from the Tenth Circuit, the district court addressed one further issue:
whether the portion of the provision banning Sharia could be severed from the remainder of the law
forbidding consideration of law from all other nations or cultures. Applying Oklahoma law on
severability, the district court held that the aim to ban Sharia was the electorate’s overwhelming
purpose in approving the ballot measure, and that there was insufficient evidence of an independent
electoral purpose to ban all foreign law regardless of content or origin. Accordingly, the court held
that the entire measure should be permanently enjoined. Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198,
1206 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
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appropriately part of the U.S. legal terrain.138 The law made this assumption
despite the fact that millions of U.S. citizens are Muslim.139 Further, the law
made no comparable assumption of alien foreignness with respect to law derived
from any other faith. By labeling Islamic beliefs as a foreign corruption of
“proper” U.S. legal principles, the law conveyed the implicit message that
followers of Islam have a lower status than others, and that their legal traditions
are less worthy of judicial consideration than those of the non-Muslim
majority.140
Of course, the non-Muslim majority in the United States, and in Oklahoma, is
overwhelmingly Christian.141 As many have argued, there are significant JudeoChristian overtones and undertones throughout domestic U.S. law. 142 For
example, several courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have
relied on U.S. law’s biblical legal roots as a basis for upholding government
displays of the Ten Commandments.143 While excluding “foreign” Sharia law,
the Oklahoma Amendment effectively permitted consideration of domestic law
that derives from underlying Judeo-Christian legal principles, at least to the
extent such consideration is permitted under the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. 144 By identifying and excluding Sharia as “foreign,” the
Oklahoma Amendment carried an implicit message that at least one other legalreligious tradition—the Judeo-Christian legal tradition—is not “foreign.” 145
138. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
139. See Joshua Holland, The Truth About American Muslims, THE NATION (Dec. 8, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/heres-why-we-should-all-praise-allah-for-american-muslims/.
140. See Gerson, supra note 30.
141. Adults in Oklahoma: Religious composition of adults in Oklahoma, PEW RES. CTR.,
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/oklahoma/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016)
(Seventy-nine percent of Oklahoma residents are Christian, while less than one percent are
Muslim); Religions: Explore religious groups in the U.S. by tradition, family, and denomination,
PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016)
(Approximately seventy percent of people who reside in the United States are Christian, while less
than one-tenth of one percent are Muslim).
142. See Sanja Zgonjanin, Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in Judicial
Decision-Making, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 31, 63–65 (2005). See generally John W. Welch, Biblical
Law in America: Historical Perspectives and Potentials for Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 611 (2002)
(discussing the Biblical foundations of U.S. law, including Judeo-Christian colonial law).
143. See, e.g., Steven K. Green, The Fount of Everything Just and Right? The Ten
Commandments as a Source of American Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 525, 528–30, 549–58 (2000)
(broad examination of the relationship between the Biblical Ten Commandments and American
jurisprudence).
144. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that the Amendment
“implies that whatever religions the legislature considered to be part of domestic or Oklahoma culture
would not have their legal precepts prohibited from consideration”). See generally Eugene Volokh,
Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 431 (2014)
(cataloguing the many situations in which American law typically accommodates religious concerns
and arguing that the same accommodations available for Jewish or Christian matters ought to apply
for other religions as well, including Islam).
145. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 144, at 446, 448, 458; see also Siegel, supra note 18.
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Arguably, the Sharia exclusion thus indirectly reflects the viewpoint advanced
by some commentators that the United States is a “Christian nation.”146 As the
Court of Appeals observed, a system that allows consideration of the legal
traditions of Judaism or Christianity, but prohibits consideration of the legal
traditions of Islam, is one that obviously entails denominational religious
preferences.147 For a brief legal moment in Oklahoma that preference became
overt, and the federal courts properly struck it down. 148 The court sent a
constitutional message that religious exceptionalism which privileges
Christianity over Islam is not appropriate, even if other forms of national legal
exceptionalism may be acceptable.149 Religious exceptionalism directly offends
our federal constitutional commitment to “official religious neutrality.”150
Whether the back-up statute in Oklahoma,151 and the statutes adopted in other
states that omit the specific reference to Sharia also violate the Establishment
Clause is a more challenging constitutional question.152 Without the specific
reference to Sharia, there is a stronger claim that the law does not single out a
particular religious belief for disapprobation. 153 Consequently, there is a
stronger argument that the Larson strict scrutiny standard should not apply.154
A specific reference to a particular religion on the face of the statute, however,
is not the only way of accomplishing a denominational preference. 155 For
example, in Larson the statutory denominational preference stemmed from
discrimination based on sources of funding. 156 Additionally, if the Larson
analysis in cases involving religious discrimination resembles the treatment of
race discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, a formally neutral statute
could be based on an unconstitutional legislative purpose to accomplish religious
discrimination.157 In the context of state AFIL statutes, there is considerable
146. See, e.g., LibertyPatriot, John McCain: Constitution Established a Christian Nation?,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kw5KqxefKgw (Interview with
Senator John McCain, the 2008 Republican Presidential candidate, commented that “the
Constitution established the United States of America as a Christian nation”).
147. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1982).
148. Compare Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1206 (W.D. Okla 2010) (district court
upheld the Oklahoma Amendment as constitutional), with Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130–31 (the
Oklahoma Amendment failed to satisfy strict scrutiny).
149. See infra Part I.
150. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
151. See H.B. 1060, 2013 Leg., 54th Sess. (Okla. 2013).
152. H.R. Con. Res. 44, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010); H.F. 575, 84th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011); H.B. 785, 2010 Leg., 36th Reg. Sess. (La. 2010); S.B. 267, 97th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).
153. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
154. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
155. See, e.g., id. at 253, 255.
156. Id. at 230.
157. Take for example the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., where the Court concluded that when a statute appears to be facially neutral,
disproportionate impact on a racial minority is not sufficient to prove that the statute violates the
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evidence that the chief political force behind the laws is antipathy to Islam, even
when specific reference to Sharia is omitted. 158 Under equal protection
principles, however, proving discriminatory purpose is quite difficult. Courts
rarely find a race-discriminatory purpose unless there is a formal race
classification. Thus it is possible that courts considering the Larson standard
would similarly find it inapplicable to a formally religious neutral measure.159
This would be a particularly likely outcome if legislators avoided any direct or
explicit references to Islam or Sharia not only in statutory language, but also in
their legislative deliberations.
That still leaves the general Establishment Clause standard—whatever that
standard presently is.160 While the district court in Awad applied the Lemon test,
supplemented with an endorsement analysis, there are reasons to believe that the
Supreme Court may depart from the Lemon approach. Should that happen it
remains unclear what standard, if any, will replace Lemon.161 In the absence of
definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, the best approach is to glean a few
basic precepts from Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Equal Protection Clause. 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977). Instead, it reasoned that the petitioner must
show some discriminatory purpose by the legislature. Id. It need not be proven that discrimination
was the sole purpose of the legislation, but if discrimination against any racial group was a
“motivating factor,” the statute is suspect. Id. Larson could conceivably be applied similarly for
religious cases, thereby throwing into question any statute where the legislature may have aimed for
discrimination on religious grounds, even if the statute’s language is ostensibly neutral. See 456
U.S. at 230.
158. See, e.g., PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1–2, 7–8 (arguing that many of the recent foreign
law ban proposals are rewritten versions of anti-Sharia statutes aimed at discriminating against
Muslims).
159. See K.G. Jan Pillai, Shrinking Domain of Invidious Intent, 9 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.
J. 525, 526–27 (2001) (exploring the decision in Washington v. Davis, which indicates that
“invidious intent” is the keystone for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and arguing that this
reading creates substantial difficulty in proving purposeful discrimination); see also Ian F. Haney
Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109
YALE L.J. 1717, 1830–43 (2000).
160. See David W. Cook, The Un-Established Establishment Clause: A Circumstantial
Approach to Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 71, 86–90 (2004)
(outlining the various problems with modern tests for determining violation of the Establishment
Clause, including the Lemon test); Mark C. Rahdert, Court Reform and Breathing Space Under the
Establishment Clause, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835, 852–53 (2012) [hereinafter Rahdert,
Establishment Clause] (discussing the uncertainty about the applicability of the Lemon standard);
see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1821 (2014) (adding a “traditional
practice[s]” test to the range of Establishment Clause standards). See generally Daniel R. Ray, The
Establishment Clause in 2009: A Baseline for Measuring Change, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 493
(2009) (providing an overview of the current tests for Establishment Clause violation, including the
Lemon test, and the strengths and inadequacies of these tests).
161. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305–06 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (using a
combination of Lemon-style Establishment Clause reasoning and Justice O’Connor’s “Endorsement
Test”); see also Rahdert, Establishment Clause, supra note 160, at 852–59 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s apparent readiness to move away from Lemon analysis for issues under the Establishment
Clause).
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To begin that inquiry, it seems reasonably safe to conclude that regardless of
whatever else the Establishment Clause does or does not do, it should prohibit
the government from pursuing deliberately preferential religious policies. 162
Thus, an enactment that favors one set of religious principles over others, treats
one set as true and others as false, or treats one set of religious principles as more
consonant with U.S. law than others, should be prohibited.163 Conversely, an
enactment that selectively excludes one set of religious principles because it is
not consonant with U.S. law should also be prohibited.164 Such an enactment
operates either as an endorsement of a particular religious-legal tradition, or as
its opposite, a denigration of a particular religious-legal tradition.165 This type
of disparate treatment places followers of the favored religious-legal tradition in
a legally preferred position, while adherents to the disfavored religious-legal
tradition are distinctly disadvantaged.166 Neither legislative approach should be
constitutionally acceptable.167
Evaluating the legislative intent behind a formally neutral prohibition on the
application of “foreign” law depends on two criteria: (1) whether those enacting
the law intended to treat one set of religious-legal principles as “foreign” and
another as “domestic”; and (2) whether a prohibition on foreign law would
function that way.168 If a jurisdiction adopts the view that “Christian” or “JudeoChristian” values are “domestic,” and thus superior, while “non-JudeoChristian” values are “foreign” and impermissible, thus casting them inferior,
the foreign/domestic distinction takes on a preferential religious coloration that
offends the separation of church and state.169 On the other hand, if a jurisdiction
takes the view that all religious traditions are equally excluded as “foreign,” or
that there is no distinction between foreign and domestic religious legal
traditions, then the law would be functionally neutral with respect to religious
beliefs. This approach would be constitutional under the Establishment
Clause.170
162. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
163. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788
(1973); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16.
164. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16.
165. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
166. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 140.
167. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court held that Greece’s practice of
beginning legislative sessions with a prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause. 134 S. Ct.
1811, 1825, 1827–28 (2014). The prayers in question in the case were generally explicitly Christian
in their orientation. Id. at 1824. However, Justice Kennedy emphasized in his majority opinion that
these prayers could not be used to coerce or condemn non-believers. Id. at 1827. While the future
effects of the decision remain unclear, the general proposition that specific governmental religion
preferences are prohibited under the Establishment Clause remains intact.
168. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 18 tbl. 1; see also James A. Sonne, Domestic
Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of Ordered Liberty, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 717, 748
(2015).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 142–52.
170. Cf. McCreary City. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
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Given the fairly deliberate stirrings of anti-Muslim sentiment underlying
Oklahoma’s SOS Amendment and comparable legislative debates in other
states, it is difficult to avoid the inference that AFIL proposals are specifically
aimed against Muslims.171 Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that a state could
carefully stick to a secular version of wholesale exceptionalism that did not rely
on antipathy to Islam as a basis for prohibiting judicial access to foreign or
international law.172 Some of the post-Oklahoma AFIL state statutes are at least
ostensibly motivated by this concept.173 Some AFIL state statutes attempt to
establish a state policy against the application of foreign law or prohibit its use
in circumstances where a foreign legal system does not provide “fundamental
rights” equivalent to those provided under U.S. law.174 By incorporating this
type of statutory language, a state may be able to sustain the argument that the
statute has nothing to do with religion, and therefore does not implicate the
Establishment Clause in any way. 175 Such a carefully drafted and justified
statute would likely survive an Establishment Clause challenge.176
II. WHOLESALE EXCEPTIONALISM
While the Constitution forbids preferential treatment of Christianity over
Islam, it does not prohibit preferring U.S. law over foreign law. 177 Indeed,
constitutional democracy is founded on the notion that the people will be
represented by their elected legislators to determine the laws that apply within
their political community.178 The very act of legislating entails an assertion of
domestic law’s presumptive precedence over external legal sources. 179
Consequently, it should not offend constitutional values for a jurisdiction
formally to prefer domestic over “foreign” law.
In the U.S. federal system, there are some inherent structural limits on a state’s
capacity to effectuate a thoroughgoing domestic law preference. Federal law
must control over state or local law, and individual states must, to some degree,
respect and apply each other’s laws. 180 Thus, under the Supremacy Clause,

171. PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1–2, 7–8.
172. Id. at 1–2.
173. Id. at 7–8, 18.
174. Id. at 10.
175. Id. at 13 (noting that “courts have developed a carefully calibrated system that ensures
respect for [foreign] law and at the same time prevents enforcement of laws contrary to our nation’s
public policy.”).
176. Id.; see also supra notes 151–72 and accompanying text.
177. U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause does not include foreign law as “the
supreme Law of the Land” and thus allows domestic law to be preferred over other sources of law).
178. See Democracy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
democracies (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
179. See Peter Hay, The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the
United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 213, 215–16 (2014).
180. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 1.
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states must apply federal law and give it priority over conflicting state law.181
As the Supreme Court recognized in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 182 this
requirement is essential to the formation of a national legal system.183 Similarly,
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states must give force to the laws and
judgments of other states.184 Additionally, where national law incorporates “the
[l]aw of [n]ations,” states must follow and honor relevant international principles
that national law has absorbed.185 However, these are exceptions that prove the
rule.186 These concepts operate within a national sovereign legal system. In
situations in which federal law does not apply, and where states are not obliged
to give full faith and credit to each other’s laws and judgments, states have a
presumptive constitutional prerogative to create domestic law and to prefer it to
all other sources of law.187
While states have generally enforced the precedence of domestic law, they
have never completely excluded foreign or international legal sources.188 To the
contrary, state courts historically operated as courts of “general jurisdiction.”189
As long as the state courts possess proper jurisdiction over the parties before
them and satisfy the due process “minimum contacts” requirement, they have
been able to apply any legal principle relevant to resolve the dispute, regardless

181. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
182. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
183. Id. at 340–41 (1816); cf. Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603,
618–19, 627–28 (1813).
184. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. It has long been held that international customary law can
be incorporated into federal law. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900). The
Supremacy Clause prohibits state laws that contradict federal law, and when law is in conflict with
international customs that have been incorporated into federal law, the states are bound to follow
this law. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
186. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause dictates the general rule that when
federal law exists, it will be held superior to any other type of law).
187. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–96 (2015). There may be some rare
circumstances in which a state’s refusal to honor the law of another jurisdiction would entail a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. Thus, for
example, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held that the states are constitutionally
required to recognize same-sex marriages legally occurring in other jurisdictions. Id. at 2607–08.
While the Court did not deal directly with same-sex marriages occurring in international forums,
the reasoning of the case would likely extend to include similar constitutional protection for such a
marriage. See, e.g., id.
188. Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 219, 227 (2014)
[hereinafter Volokh, Foreign Law].
189. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 439 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990); see also Foxhall Realty Law
Offices, Inc. v. Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Sheldon
v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (highlighting that “state courts are courts of general
jurisdiction”).
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of its source.190 This is what courts of general jurisdiction do.191 This is what
courts in the United Kingdom have done under the common law judicial system
that the United States inherited.192 This is what U.S. state courts have done for
more than two centuries. 193 As Alexander Hamilton recognized in The
Federalist, this distinctive feature of state courts is what enabled the drafters of
the Constitution to leave the structure and content of the lower federal courts
undetermined.194 It is part of the bedrock of the U.S. judicial system.195
Oklahoma’s SOS Amendment and other AFIL state measures attempt to alter
this bedrock proposition of general state judicial authority.196 In effect, they
command that state courts should become courts of limited subject matter
jurisdiction that should consider and decide only matters of domestic U.S.
federal and state law.197 The key question posed by this new and historically
remarkable step is whether the imposition of such a domestically limited
jurisdiction is desirable.
A. Four Levels of AFIL
To evaluate this question, it is helpful to recognize the four different levels at
which AFIL statutes potentially operate: jurisdiction; rules of decision; matters
of interpretation; and questions of evidence.198 The AFIL state statutes that have
been enacted do not typically differentiate the four different levels. It is important
to note that the different levels may affect judicial decision-making.199

190. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
191. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text; see also infra note 192 and accompanying
text.
192. Court of Queen’s Bench: British Law, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Court-of-Queens-Bench (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
193. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 450, 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898)
(demonstrating that state courts have been courts of general jurisdiction since the founding of the
United States).
194. Id. at 450, 452–53.
195. Id. at 451.
The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws,
and in civil cases, lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its
jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part
of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of legal
discussion to our courts.
Id.
196. H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010); see PATEL ET AL., supra note 36,
at 15–18.
197. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
198. See infra Sections II.A.1–4.
199. See S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); see also S.B. 58, 2013 Leg.,
155th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 79, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012); H.B. 785, 2010 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (La. 2010); H.B. 695, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1–4.
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1. Jurisdiction
The broadest possible effect of an AFIL statute is to deprive state courts of
jurisdiction in a dispute where an issue of foreign or international law may
arise.200 Under an AFIL statute, if a plaintiff’s claim or a defendant’s defense
arises from foreign or international law, the state court may not consider that
aspect of the case.201 Unless that issue is completely severable from the rest of
the dispute, the court’s inability to consider the issue may affect its competence
to decide other matters that are integrally related to the foreign or international
law question.202 As a result, the AFIL statute imposes a direct limitation on the
scope of state court’s judicial power by refusing to grant the state court the
authority to decide the entire matter.203
The proponents of AFIL statutes may not intend such an extensive curtailment
of state judicial power. Rather, they likely expect that courts will simply excise
any foreign or international legal issue from the case, leaving the remainder of
the dispute intact for the state court to decide. 204 Yet, that may not be the
outcome in practice.205 A responsible court may conclude that its inability to
address an embedded foreign or international law question deprives the court of
jurisdiction to decide the entire matter.206 Where the foreign or international
matter is an integral component of the case, it may be impossible or entail a gross
miscarriage of justice for the court to decide the remaining legal issues.207 The
court may decide that its inability to consider international or foreign law issues
warrants abstention.208 In that event, dismissal of the entire matter for want of
jurisdiction would be proper.209

200. See Hay, supra note 179, at 215–19.
201. See, e.g., Ariz. S. Con. Res. 1010; see also Fla. S.B. 58; Kan. S.B. 79; La. H.B. 785; N.C.
H.B. 695; Wyo. H.R.J. Res. 8; Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188 at 235.
202. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
203. See Peter Hay, Ole Lando & Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflict of Laws as a Technique for
Legal Integration, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
EXPERIENCE Book 2, 170 (Mauro Cappelletti, et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Hay, Integration]
(addressing the limitations on jurisdiction under uniform choice-of-law rules); see also Aaron
Fellmeth, U.S. State Legislation to Limit Use of International and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L
L. 107, 115 (2012).
204. See, e.g., Ariz. S. Con. Res. 1010; see also Fla. S.B. 58, 2013 Leg.; Kan. S.B. 79; La. H.B.
785; N.C. H.B. 695; Wyo. H.R.J. Res. 8; Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 235.
205. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 37; see also Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188,
at 227–35.
206. See Hay, Integration, supra note 203, at 173–74 (highlighting judicial reluctance “to
apply foreign law without reservation.”).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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2. Rules of Decision
A second possible effect of an AFIL statute is that it dictates a rule of decision:
in any circumstance in which a court might face a choice between domestic and
foreign law, the court must choose domestic law.210 This interpretation treats the
AFIL statute as a choice of law provision, which is how Oklahoma attempted to
characterize the SOS Amendment in its Tenth Circuit briefing. 211 This
interpretation of the AFIL statute’s effect is considerably more modest.212 It is
largely in line with the general tenor of U.S. choice of law principles.213 Those
principles command a strong preference to apply state law unless there is a
compelling reason to look elsewhere.214 With respect to foreign or international
legal sources, the courts are expected to determine that the foreign rule is
consonant with the public policy of the home state.215 Under this current choice
of law approach, cases where a court might prefer to apply foreign or
international law rather than domestic law are likely to be quite rare.216 The
effect of the AFIL statute choice of law principle is to eliminate the option of
looking to foreign or international sources, even in circumstances where
traditional choice of law principles would dictate otherwise.217
Whether such a command is wise or not will be discussed below, but at this
point it bears noting that even if such a command makes sense, there are some
matters that simply cannot be decided without resort to foreign law. Thus, for
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). The rule of
decision concept refers to any statute, law, or precedent that provides the basis for deciding or
adjudicating a case. See Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d 276, 289 (N.J. 1958)
(identifying the concept of rule of decision as a “foundation of our jurisprudence” used to
“determine the rights of, and prescribe rules of conduct for, all persons, and . . . to be followed and
applied by our courts in all cases to which they are applicable.”).
211. Reply Brief of the Defendants-Appellants at 9–10, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1133
(10th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-6273), 2011 WL 2309239 (arguing that the petitioner, Awad, was not
denied constitutional religious rights by the “Save our State” amendment, because an Oklahoma
court may still choose to consider personal preferences without specific reference to Sharia).
212. Contra Awad, 670 F.3d at 1128 (holding that the Oklahoma statute “present[ed] even
stronger ‘explicit and deliberate distinctions’ among religions” than other cases the court had
previously encountered).
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.
214. See id. (“A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of
its own state on choice of law”). See generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, § 42.1. Jurisdiction: How
Determined, in A TREATISE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 274–75 (1935).
215. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 3–4; see also Hay, supra note 179, at 231.
216. See Hay, supra note 179, at 231 (noting that choice-of-law principles will allow “court[s]
(state or federal) to conclude that forum law applies, even where foreign law has been properly put
in issue”); Peter Hay, European Conflict Law After the American “Revolution—Comparative
Notes, 1-2015 EUROPEAN L. FORUM 6 (discussing role of value judgments in conflicts law and
noting tendency of American courts to favor the law of the forum as the “better” law).
217. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 1010, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); see also S.B. 58, 2013
Leg., 155th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 79, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012); H.B. 785, 2010
Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010); H.B. 695, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); H.R.J. Res. 8,
61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011); Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 235.

2016]

Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law

567

example, imagine a state court dispute that raises an issue over whether one of
the parties owns property in foreign nation X. The question of legal ownership
can be decided only by reference to X’s law. There is simply no way to
substitute the law of the home state, or of any other jurisdiction, in place of X’s
law on that disputed issue. If the issue is central to the case, there will be no way
for the state court to render a just decision without addressing and determining
that question of foreign law. Thus, even at the rule of decision level, the effect
of an AFIL provision may be to prevent the state court from deciding some
important and potentially dispositive legal issues.
In such a circumstance, there might be a way around an AFIL statute if the
parties were able to stipulate as to the effect of X’s law.218 The court might
avoid the strictures of an AFIL statute simply by accepting the stipulation without
itself “considering” X’s law.219 But it is also possible that an AFIL statute could
be read to command that, even in the absence of dispute, the court would be
precluded from applying X’s law.220 A court that accepted the stipulation about
the result of foreign law and then used it to reach its decision would be
effectively applying the foreign law in question.221 If doing so is prohibited by
the AFIL statute, a responsible court still might have no choice but to dismiss
the action.222 Additionally, there could be cases where the parties agreed about
the content of the foreign law, but still disputed its application to the facts of the
case. 223 If the domestic court were to attempt to resolve that dispute over
application, it would be impossible to avoid the conclusion that it would be
“considering,” as well as applying, the foreign law in deciding the case.224
3. Matters of Interpretation
A third potential effect of an AFIL statute is to prevent the local state courts
from using foreign or international law as an interpretive resource for deciding
a disputed domestic-law question. 225 When one looks about for a possible
religiously neutral trigger for the AFIL movement, this aspect of the law comes
most immediately to mind. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has been roundly
218. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 430 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that U.S. and
foreign actors may explicitly stipulate to the use of foreign law and by doing so prevent forum non
conveniens dismissal from U.S. courts). See generally, Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the
Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global
Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 888–90 (2011) (addressing the ability of U.S. and
foreign actors to enter stipulations regarding the application of foreign law in relevant matters).
219. See Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430.
220. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010).
221. See Wilson, supra note 218, at 890.
222. See supra notes 205–12 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., infra note 238.
224. E.g., Davis, supra note 54, at 643 (discussing the implications of a case in which parties
agreed to the content of the applicable international law, forcing the court to apply international
law).
225. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 114.
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criticized in politically conservative quarters for occasionally looking to foreign
and international sources in the course of deciding domestic constitutional
questions, such as what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or what
liberties the due process clause guarantees.226
AFIL statute advocates probably want to ensure that their state court judges
do not behave in a similar fashion when deciding domestic state law questions.227
This aspect of an AFIL provision does not have the same sort of structural impact
as a limit on jurisdiction or on rules of decision.228 Courts are rarely, if ever,
obliged to use foreign or international resources in reaching a decision on a
contested domestic legal question.229 Unless a domestic law itself directly refers
to or incorporates a foreign or international legal matter—in which case it is open
to debate whether the foreign or international matter is still “foreign” 230 —
reference to law beyond the domestic jurisdiction is unlikely to be necessary to
render a just and complete legal decision.
The impact at this stage is not so much on the authority of the court as it is on
the discretion of the judge.231 The legislature is not directing what type of matter
the court can decide, but rather how the judge should go about making his or her
decision.232 While this leaves the jurisdiction and decisional power of the court
largely intact, it raises questions about the wisdom of legislative intervention on
judicial independence.233 Whether or not this goal makes sense will be discussed
at greater length below.

226. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, The Use and Misuse of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts, CATO AT
LIBERTY (May 19, 2010, 8:51 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/use-misuse-foreign-law-us-courts
(arguing against the Supreme Court’s approach of looking to foreign laws in interpreting the U.S.
Constitution).
227. American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign
Laws—Including Shariah, supra note 37.
228. See supra Sections II.A.1–2.
229. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43,
53–54 (2004) [hereinafter Koh, International Law] (highlighting that “domestic courts must play a
key role in coordinating U.S. domestic constitutional rules with rules of foreign and international
law”).
230. See, e.g., supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
231. American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against Foreign
Laws – Including Shariah, supra note 37.
232. See H.B. 1060, 2013 Leg., 54th Sess. (Okla. 2013) (specifying what the court cannot base
its rulings on, but not specifying what type of matter the judge should decide).
233. See, e.g., Devera B. Scott et al., The Assault on Judicial Independence and the Uniquely
Delaware Response, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 217, 238–40 (2009); Hon. Randall T. Shepard, Electing
Judges and the Impact of Judicial Independence, 11 N.C. ST. B.J. 26, 26 (2006); Janet Stidman
Eveleth, Preserving Our Judicial Independence, 37 MD. B.J. 58, 60 (2004); Justice Peter T. Zarella
& Judge Thomas A. Bishop, Judicial Independence at a Crossroads, 77 CONN. B.J. 21, 22–23
(2003) (all discussing the difficulty of establishing judicial independence in state courts).
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4. Questions of Evidence
The final possible impact of an AFIL statute concerns the use of foreign or
international law as “evidence” in the course of determining a domestic
dispute.234 Especially in light of the proliferation of cross-border business and
personal activities in the twenty-first century, there are many situations in which
the determination of a domestic legal issue requires a court to make certain
findings about a legal matter abroad.235 For example, a suit seeking payments
under a license agreement might depend on whether the licensor held a valid
patent under the laws of a foreign country, 236 or an action for divorce and
accompanying alimony might depend on whether the parties were legally
married in a foreign country.237 In these circumstances, courts have sometimes
treated the foreign legal issue not as one to be decided as a matter of law, but
rather as a question of fact.238 Parties have been obliged to offer testimony or
documentary evidence on the law of the foreign nation and its significance for
the disputed facts in the domestic action.239 Under this scenario, local courts
arguably do not “decide” the law of the foreign nation; rather, they “find” it as a
determination of fact.240
Whether the AFIL statutes forbid this practice is an open question, but there
are reasons to think that such a fact-finding approach to foreign law might also
be forbidden. Even where the court is “finding” the law of nation X, it is still
“considering” the law of X by determining its factual relevance, and it may well
be “applying” the law of X if that law represents a significant component of the
judgment of the domestic court. To the extent a court is forbidden from even
accounting for the law as a matter of fact, its capacity to render fair judgment in
disputes before it may well be even further impaired.
B. The Wisdom of Wholesale Exceptionalism
Is it wise for a state to forbid the judges of its courts from considering and
applying foreign law? Although most voters and legislators might reflexively
think the answer should be “yes,” careful examination should lead to the

234. See, e.g., infra notes 236–40 and accompanying text.
235. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 114.
236. See In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d 942, 944–45 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (regarding the validity of a
patent under Greek law); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 366 F.2d 238, 239 (6th Cir.
1966) (dealing with the validity of foreign patent applications).
237. See, e.g., Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So.2d 731, 733–34, 736–37, 742 (La. Ct. App. 2008)
(a divorce case involving first cousins, who were married in Iran, requiring a Louisiana court to
decide if the marriage was valid under U.S. law); Siddiqui v. Siddiqui, 968 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146–47
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (dealing with the validity of a foreign divorce).
238. For example, in Ghassemi, the court looked to Iranian law to determine, as a matter of
fact, that the parties were legally married, even though Louisiana law itself prohibited the marriage
of first cousins. 998 So.2d at 738–39.
239. See Id. at 740-41; see also Siddiqui, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
240. See, e.g., Ghassemi, 998 So.2d at 740; Siddiqui, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
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conclusion that the answer is “no.” Previous scholarship on this topic has
identified a range of reasons for thinking this kind of U.S. exceptionalism is
misguided and undesirable in the context of federal constitutional
adjudication. 241 Similar considerations apply in the context of state court
adjudication.242
1. False Premises
At the outset, exceptionalist claims rest on flawed premises about the views
of the founding generation of the U.S. regarding foreign and international law.
The Framers of U.S. constitutional government were well versed in foreign and
international law, and they actively attempted to incorporate what they
understood as its best elements into the U.S. constitutional structure.243 Early
U.S. courts relied extensively on British common law, and they continued to do
so long after U.S. independence formally separated the two legal systems,
making British statutes and precedents “foreign” law. 244 U.S. courts also
frequently appealed to continental legal sources, and in appropriate cases they
relied on what they understood to be the “law of nations,” often citing eminent
continental international legal authorities, such as Grotius and Vattel. 245
Prominent legal scholars, including Justice Joseph Story and Chancellor James
Kent, advocated the idea of legal “science,” whereby the decisional law of
distinct jurisdictions labored toward elucidation of common “universal” legal

241. Rahdert, supra note 44, at 648 (arguing that exceptionalism “ignores all the common
constitutional ground that invites comparative constitutional analysis in the first place” and
“overvalues the role of American history in defining constitutional powers and liberties.”).
242. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 345 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
[A]n attention to the judgment of other nations, is important to every Government . . .
independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable . . . that it
should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy . . . [and]
in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong
passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world,
may be the best guide that can be followed.
Id. (quoted in Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk with You, LEGAL AFF. (July–Aug. 2004),
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_jackson_julaug04.msp); see also
Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and
Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 464 (1997) (“[The Framers] recognized the
international legal significance of U.S. independence: As new members in the community of
nations, the Founders felt bound, both ethically and pragmatically, to inherit and abide by the law
of nations. The Constitution reflected this disposition in both text and structure.”).
244. See, e.g., WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES 52–53 (4th ed. 2006); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
67–69 (3d ed. 2005).
245. See, e.g., The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 278 (1814) (referring to “the law of nations”
and Vattel in deciding what factors bear on a person’s “domicil[e]”); Brown v. United States, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 134 (1814) (citing the work of Grotius in a discussion of lawful self-defense).
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principles. 246 In short, the judges, lawyers, and legal theorists of the early
republic did not regard U.S. law as separate and apart from European sources,
but instead as indelibly intertwined with them.247
This attitude permeated the U.S. constitutional order. 248 As Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsberg has observed, the Declaration of Independence, which put
forward a legal justification for American independence, appealed directly to
collective reason and expressed “respect” for the “opinions of [human]kind.”249
Far from being an exceptionalist document, it attempted to justify the American
Revolution by reference to principles of “natural law” that would apply to all
nations.250 The U.S. Constitution even more specifically refers to the “law of
nations” as a source of law that becomes, in appropriate circumstances, part of
the “supreme [l]aw of the [l]and.” 251 It also lists treaties with foreign
governments, then the principal source of international law, as a variety of
national supreme law, and it gives courts, including state courts, the power and
obligation both to interpret and to enforce them.252 In the context of the late
246. See Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 1239, Joseph Story,
the Natural Law, and Modern Jurisprudence 2 (Oct. 23, 2013), http://thf_media.s3.
amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/HL1239.pdf (exploring Justice Story’s opinion on the existence of
natural law and the universality of legal doctrines); John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the
History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 567–69 (1993) (explaining Chancellor Kent’s
view of law as a science, as well as his views on universal/ natural laws).
247. Langbein, supra note 246, at 566–67.
248. See infra notes 249–55 and accompanying text.
249. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, “A Decent Respect to the
Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication, Keynote Address at the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 1, 2005, in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 351, 352 (2005).
The drafters and signers of the Declaration of Independence cared about the opinions of
other peoples; they placed before the world the reasons why the States, joining together
to become the United States of America, were impelled to separate from Great Britain.
The Declarants stated their reasons out of ‘a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.’
To that end, they presented a long list of grievances, submitting the ‘Facts’ - the ‘long
Train of [the British Crown’s] Abuses and Usurpations’ - to the scrutiny of ‘a candid
World.’
Id.
250. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (maintaining that “the Laws
of Nature and of Nature’s God” are the source of natural rights); see also Natural Law: The
Ultimate Source of Constitutional Law, NAT’L CTR. FOR CONST. STUD., https://www.nccs.net/
natural-law-the-ultimate-source-of-constitutional-law.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (noting that
that Founders alluded to a higher law as the ultimate source “to protect . . . natural rights for all of
mankind.”).
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define and punish . . . [o]ffen[s]es against the [l]aw of
[n]ations”); id. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
118 (1804) (declaring that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423
(1815) (stating that, absent a contrary statute, “the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a
part of the law of the land.”).
252. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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eighteenth century, these deliberate efforts to draw explicit connections between
domestic and international law were remarkable legal innovations that reflected
a strong internationalist perspective shared by the Framers of the Constitution.253
Early Supreme Court jurists also shared Enlightenment beliefs about natural
law and justice that led them both to seek and demonstrate alignment between
the reasoning in their judicial opinions and foreign or international sources.254
Indeed, international and foreign law formed a recurring component of Supreme
Court reasoning and adjudication during the first several decades of the
existence of the United States.255 If original constitutional intention, and the
early practices of our courts, have any notable bearing on the question of whether
U.S. courts should consider and, when appropriate, apply foreign or international
law, they should count in favor of, not against, the practice.256
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
253. See Ginsburg, supra note 249 (“In writing the Constitution, the Framers looked to other
systems and to thinkers from other lands for inspiration, and they understood that the new nation
would be bound by ‘the Law of Nations,’ today called international law.”).
254. See, e.g., The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 278 (1814); Brown v. United States, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 134 (1814); see also MARK DAVID HALL, JUSTICE, LAW, AND THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF JAMES WILSON, FIRST PRINCIPLE
SERIES REPORT NO. 26 3–5 (June 1, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2009/06/justice-law-and-the-creation-of-the-american-republic-the-forgotten-legacy-of-jameswilson (describing Justice James Wilson’s views on natural and divine law and their application to
American law); Walter H. E. Jaeger, John Marshall: The Man, The Judge and The Law of Nations,
8 AM. U. L. REV. 28, 31–33 (1959) (overview of Chief Justice John Marshall’s views on natural
law and the law of nations, and his application of these ideas to American jurisprudence).
255. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, The Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign
Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2007).
Citation of foreign law did not merely reflect the paucity of relevant domestic precedent.
Rather, it reflected a deeply held understanding of law, in which background legal
principles did not derive from any particular jurisdiction. Such background principles
percolated through specific legal systems, filling gaps and providing context for positive
enactments such as statutes and written constitutions. Given this understanding of law,
frequent citation of foreign legal authority inevitably resulted from the implementation of
transnational legal principles.
Id. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 753, 760, 782 (2005) (documenting the Court’s historical practice
of citing foreign law in decisions).
256. Calabresi and Zimdahl have argued, in terms of federal constitutional adjudication, that
utilization of foreign and international legal sources has a stronger historical pedigree and may be
more appropriate in some contexts (for example determinations of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment or determinations of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment) than
it is in others (such as substantive due process). See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 255, at 755–
56. While the author might not personally agree on the precise specifics of this observation
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2. Overbreadth.
In addition to being based on false premises about the Founders’ views of
foreign law, wholesale exceptionalism, as it is usually argued in the U.S., entails
a variety of difficulties that arise from its reflexive and undiscriminating
invocation. 257 Those who rely on U.S. exceptionalism typically paint their
position with unusually broad and sweeping strokes.258 They rarely make any
effort to substantiate the claim that exceptional circumstances have influenced
particular legal developments, and they almost never draw explicit legal
connections between purportedly unique aspects of U.S. law, culture, or society,
and the specific legal issues that they maintain are unique.259 They also typically
ignore any questions of degree,260 and they dismiss as irrelevant any influence
that U.S. law has or should exercise on foreign sources or foreign
adjudication.261
This undiscriminating treatment of all foreign and international law
adjudication as equally suspect, and presumptively prohibited, seems massively
overbroad, even in regard to the probable intentions of the voters and legislators
who support it.262 As the Tenth Circuit observed in Awad, AFIL laws typically
prohibit consideration of foreign or international law when the legislature’s
choice of law interests are concerned not with which law will be considered, but
with which law will be applied.263 Even with respect to application, there are
probably many instances in which the specific application of foreign law called
for in a particular case poses no discernible threat to the domestic legal edifice,
regarding constitutional law, their position is roughly consistent with the distinction drawn in this
article between wholesale and selective exceptionalism.
257. See, e.g., Rahdert, supra note 44, at 589.
258. This is especially prevalent among some highly conservative political groups that advocate
for AFIL statutes, where Islam is portrayed as inherently contrary to fundamental American values
and beliefs. See generally Press Release, Am. Freedom L. Ctr, supra note 37; American Laws for
American Courts, supra note 37; American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional
Rights Against Foreign Laws–Including Shariah, supra note 37; Confronting the Threat of Radical
Islam, supra note 37; SANE Special Update: Material Support of Jihad Statute in Tennessee, supra
note 37.
259. Cf. Andrew Kohut & Bruce Stokes, The Problem of American Exceptionalism, PEW RES.
CTR. (May 9, 2006), http://www.pewresearch.org/2006/05/09/the-problem-of-americanexceptionalism/.
260. To the typical exceptionalist, for example, English law and Islamic law, both being
“foreign,” are equally irrelevant to U.S. law, even though much U.S. law is based on English
sources, and the U.S. and U.K. share hundreds of years of common law development.
261. See generally American Laws for American Courts Protects Constitutional Rights Against
Foreign Laws-Including Shariah, supra note 37; Press Release, Am. Freedom L. Ctr., supra note
37; American Laws for American Courts, supra note 37; CTR. FOR SEC. POL’Y, supra note 37; SANE
Special Update: Material Support of Jihad Statute in Tennessee, supra note 37; Confronting the
Threat of Radical Islam, supra note 37 (all lacking any discussion of American influence on foreign
sources, instead focusing exclusively on the negative effects they believe foreign law would have
on American jurisprudence).
262. See Islam, supra note 76, at 981–82.
263. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012).

574

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:537

yet may well be necessary to the resolution of an otherwise domestic legal
matter.
Consider, for example, a probate case in which a testator purports to distribute
a property he or she claims to have owned in Morocco. Whether or not the
testator owns the property is a matter of Moroccan law which simply cannot be
determined any other way. Yet a state probate court, in a jurisdiction with an
AFIL statute, might be unable to determine ownership if it were prohibited from
considering the Moroccan law needed to do so, and hence it would also be unable
to enforce the relevant provisions of the testator’s will. It is doubtful that voters
or legislators supporting an AFIL statute would intend to deprive state courts the
authority to act in such a situation, yet that is the potential impact of such a law.
3. Non-necessity and Inefficiency
Rather than eliminating all consideration, or even all application of foreign
law, the more immediate concern of voters and legislators likely has to do with
an entirely different sort of situation—one in which state courts face a legitimate
choice between applying a domestic or a competing foreign legal principle.264
The cases of alleged state court judicial abuse almost always involve situations
in which the court supposedly failed to apply a domestic legal principle,
deferring instead to a foreign legal principle.265 Supporters of AFIL provisions
want state courts always to choose the domestic alternative.266
How necessary or wise that command may be should depend on one’s views
regarding the content and operation of existing choice of law principles and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.267 Choice of law principles already have a
strong built-in bias for domestic law in most situations.268 Initially, choice of
law principles only raise the possibility of resorting to foreign or international
law in circumstances involving “true conflict,” in which the competing
264. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text.
265. The most prominent example of this is in the much-contested case, S.D. v. M.J.R.,
involving a Moroccan couple living in New Jersey. 2 A.3d 412, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2010).
Though her husband had repeatedly raped his wife, the district judge refused to grant the wife a
restraining order, based at least in part on the ground that marital rape is not a crime under Moroccan
Sharia law. Id. at 417–18. Even though the district court decision was promptly overturned on
appeal, the case became the center of a media firestorm, with AFIL statute supporters citing the
decision as wrongly applying foreign law over domestic statutes and public policy. See, e.g., Abed
Awad, The True Story of Sharia in American Courts, THE NATION (Jun. 14, 2012),
http://www.thenation.com/article/true-story-sharia-american-courts/.
266. Hay, supra note 179, at 234.
267. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 116–17 (discussing the contradictory relationship among
choice-of-law clauses, the concept of forum non conveniens, and recent AFIL statutes); Walter W.
Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign Law in
Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1180–82 (2005) (providing a broad overview
of forum non conveniens and its relationship to the application of foreign law in U.S. courts);
Wilson, supra note 218, at 897-99 (discussing a court’s ability to hear issues relating to international/
foreign law in light of forum non conveniens principles).
268. See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text.
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principles would lead to different standards and results.269 In circumstances in
which a true conflict exists, the proponent of the foreign law provision must
make a strong showing both that it has a closer connection than the local law to
the underlying dispute, and that it is consistent with domestic public policy.270
Moreover, in many circumstances in which foreign law might potentially apply,
the doctrine of forum non conveniens might also apply, causing the U.S. court
to defer to adjudication by a foreign tribunal that is better situated to resolve the
dispute.271 In the rare circumstance where the U.S. court retains jurisdiction,
foreign law applies under these principles, and the domestic court is a proper and
convenient forum, the court will apply foreign law only if it has a compelling
reason.272 Usually this reason will be the type that, if the situation was reversed
and a foreign court was asked to apply the law of the particular state, the state
would want the foreign jurisdiction to do so.273
In these limited circumstances, U.S. courts have long embraced principles of
international “comity,” which they share with foreign courts, thus enabling the
domestic court to respect and apply the foreign law when it is just and necessary
to do so.274 Comity principles function on an international level in a manner that
is loosely analogous to the principles of interstate comity required by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.275 However, except where these international comity
principles form a part of federal law, are enforceable under the Supremacy
Clause, or are necessary to due process, they are not constitutionally

269. See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Resolving International Conflict of Laws by Federal
and State Law, 2 PACE Y.B INT’L L 67, 73–74 (1990).
270. See, e.g., id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (AM. LAW.
INST. 1971).
271. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259–61 (1981) (upholding a district
court decision to enforce the doctrine of forum non conveniens removing a case to be tried in
Scotland); see also Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 116–17; Heiser, supra note 267, at 1178; Wilson,
supra note 218, at 898.
272. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that the district court should not have dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds).
273. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 33 (2010).
274. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3–4 (1991)
(defining comity as “a rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between
sovereigns, a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity or ‘considerations of high international
politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between nations.’”);
Childress, supra note 273, at 13–14 (providing a broad overview of international judicial comity);
Arif S. Haq, Kaepa Inc. v. Achilles Corp.: Comity in International Judicial Relations, 22 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 365, 366–67 (1996) (providing an overview of judicial comity and the
domestic case law surrounding this concept).
275. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides that “[f]ull [f]aith and [c]redit shall be given in each
state to the public [a]cts, [r]ecords, and judicial [p]roceedings of every other [s]tate.” Judicial comity
is defined as the “[p]rinciple in accordance with which courts of one state or jurisdiction give effect
to laws and judicial decisions of another state out of deference and respect, not obligation.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (6th ed. 1990).
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mandatory. 276 Nevertheless, as courts throughout the nation have long
recognized, they make good sense and contribute to the fair, smooth, and
efficient administration of justice.277
While the principles of judicial comity and reciprocity toward foreign law
mentioned above have long been a part of the U.S. choice of law framework,
they are rarely invoked, and even more rarely applied in ways that lead a
domestic court to interpret and apply a foreign law provision.278 Instead, for
good reason, courts typically do their best to find ways to minimize the necessity
of having to decide or implement foreign law. 279 Foreign law is, by nature,
unfamiliar and uncertain.280 It may also be difficult for U.S. courts to identify
and access.281 Even where foreign legal rules or principles can be successfully
identified and articulated, proper contextualization of foreign law can be
challenging and highly contestable.282 For these reasons, among others, U.S.
courts are customarily leery of delving deeply into foreign law, so their
applications of state choice of law principles naturally gravitate toward domestic
law in most situations.283
276. See Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 1971)
(“Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an
imperative or obligation.”); Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of
International Judicial Comity: Two Illustrations Using Transnational Discovery and Breard
Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 591, 600–01 (discussing the non-mandatory nature of international
judicial comity).
277. See, e.g., Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476–77 (7th Cir. 2000) (using
judicial comity in balancing a foreign judgment in light of an international notion of due process);
Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exps. Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 601–04 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying the
principle of judicial comity in the matter of a forum selection clause).
278. Cf. Childress, supra note 273, at 44.
279. See Sarah M. Fallon, Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and Maintaining
Comity Within American Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 164–66, 176 (2013)
(discussing inconsistency between AFIL statutes and principles of international comity). Indeed,
the Supreme Court has shown historical hesitancy to engage in contested interpretation of foreign
law on matters that might potentially affect U.S. foreign affairs. See, e.g., Société Nationale
Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“[C]ourts are generally ill equipped to assume the role of balancing the interests of foreign nations
with that of our own. Although transnational litigation is increasing, relatively few judges are
experienced in the area and the procedures of foreign legal systems are often poorly
understood.”); cf. First Nat’1 City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972)
(deferring to the federal executive branch on application of the “act of state” doctrine because of its
“primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs”); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (courts need to be cautious in adjudicating matters impacting
foreign affairs because they involve “decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of political power”).
280. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 279, at 176 (specifically highlighting that several judges are
unfamiliar with Islamic law).
281. See, e.g., id. at 176–77.
282. See S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
283. See Hay, Integration, supra note 203, at 170–71 (discussing the difficulty in ascertaining
foreign law under uniform conflict-of-law rules).
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Even where they admit foreign principles, the rules for choice of law retain a
filter that allows the domestic court to reject the application of any foreign
principle or rule if applying it produce results inconsistent with the policies of the
home jurisdiction, or that would contravene fundamental justice.284 This caveat
ensures that state courts in the United States are rarely, if ever, put in the position
of applying a specific foreign legal command that is substantially at odds with a
basic premise of U.S. legal culture.285
Because of these built-in safeguards, broad proscription of consideration of
foreign law by way of an AFIL statute is inefficient and unnecessary. It is
inefficient because, in those rare situations when courts resort to a foreign legal
rule, prohibition of using that rule will complicate litigation, thus forcing courts
and parties to develop elaborate ways to subtly incorporate the foreign law rules,
or to litigate in multiple forums, or to avoid litigation in a U.S. court entirely,
even when it is otherwise the most appropriate forum for the case.286 The parties
may, for example, find it necessary to litigate the foreign law issue in a foreign
court, then try to bring the outcome into the domestic litigation by way of res
judicata, issue preclusion, or a joint stipulation regarding the result. 287 The
parties might also try to convert the foreign legal issue into a putative question
of “fact” by employing expert testimony.288 There may be other alternatives as
well.289
Forcing litigants to engage in these sorts of measures seems unnecessary. The
existing domestic filters that inhibit truly inappropriate use of foreign laws are,
by long historic demonstration, adequate to preventing the miscarriage of justice
through ill-considered or unwarranted reliance on foreign law.290 These filters
permit the introduction of foreign law when it is truly discernible, relevant, and
potentially significant or determinative.291 C o n v e r s e l y , these filters exclude
284. See Pravis Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854–56 (2d Cir.
1997) (outlining both the concept of international comity and its limitations); Allied Bank Int’l v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to extend the
doctrine of international comity when doing so would go against U.S. policies); see also Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he
obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign
act.”); Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that
“comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or obligation” and refusing to apply this
doctrine when it would contradict the interest of the applying nation).
285. See Laker Airways Ltd., 731 F.2d at 937.
286. See, e.g., Volokh, Foreign Law, supra 188, at 234.
287. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 430 (10th Cir. 2006); see also In re Int’l Bechtel
Co. Ltd. v. Dep’t of Civil Aviation of the Gov’t of Dubai, 300 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 2004).
288. Wilson, supra note 218, at 901.
289. See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 267, at 1190.
290. See Pravis Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854–56 (2d Cir.
1997); Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1985);
see also Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937; Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d
435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971).
291. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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foreign law when it is indecipherable or unnecessary, is difficult to
contextualize, leads to absurd or pernicious consequences, or is unjust.292
4. Uncertainty
An additional objection to AFIL measures is their uncertain application. Short
of overt reliance on specific unadorned foreign or international legal “rules of
decision,” or explicit treatment of foreign legal adjudications, both of which
seem unquestionably to be forbidden, what exactly does such a measure
prohibit? Does the measure, for example, prohibit relying on a legal rule that is
domestic but has its origins in foreign law? Does it prohibit reference to a
foreign decision discussing a legal principle that is shared with or overlaps
domestic law? To put the matter somewhat differently, at what point does a
principle that has its origins, or that finds expression in international or foreign
law, get sufficiently “domesticated” so that it is no longer “foreign?”
One area where these types of questions can arise is tort law, a subject the
author has taught throughout his academic career. Most principles of tort law
derive from common law, and they are embraced not only in the United States,
but also by other common law nations, including Canada, Australia, and the
United Kingdom.293 When law students in the United States learn tort law, some
of the decisions that they study come from these other nations because they
adhere to the same basic tort law followed in the United States, and the decisions
of foreign courts often effectively illustrate shared guiding tort principles.294
When this happens, is foreign law being taught, or is it just being used to
illustrate and better understand well-established U.S. legal standards? What if a
particular decision from a foreign jurisdiction happens to have been cited and
relied upon by a U.S. court, or formed the basis for the enactment of an U.S.
statute, or influenced the development of a home-grown “blackletter” principle
in one of the American Law Institute’s Restatements of Torts? If that decision
292. See Pravin, 109 F.3d at 854–56; Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522; see also Laker Airways,
731 F.2d at 937; Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440; Hay, supra note 179, at 231–33.
293. See Lewis N. Klar, The Impact of U.S. Tort Law in Canada, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 359, 359
(2011).
294. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.) (English case first
introducing the concept of the reasonable person in tort law); Davies v. Mann, [1842] 10 M. & W.
546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 589 (Exch.) (English case establishing what would later become known as
the “last clear chance” doctrine of negligence law); Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856)
156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex.) (English case holding that a party can only be held liable for
negligence when failing to exercise the care a reasonable person would be expected to use); In re
Polemis & Furniss, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 KB 560, 577 (C.A.) (U.K. admiralty case holding that
a defendant can be held liable for all consequences flowing from a wrongful act regardless of
foreseeability); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (Wagon Mound No. 1),
[1961] App. Cas. 388, 422 (P.C.) (U.K. Privy Council case holding that a party can only be held
liable for reasonably foreseeable damages); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller S.S. Co.
(Wagon Mound No. 2), [1967] 1 App. Cas. 617, 643 (Privy Council case holding that loss is
recoverable where the magnitude of possible harm is so great that a reasonable man would guard
against it, even if the likelihood of the harm occurring is very small).
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is taught in the classroom, is it U.S. law that the professor is teaching, or has the
professor ventured onto potentially “dangerous” foreign ground?
The challenge of sorting foreign from domestic law in adjudication is likely
to raise comparable difficulties. It will be necessary for courts attempting to
implement an AFIL statute to determine how prominent foreign legal sources
must be to turn an otherwise permissible domestic legal principle or rule into an
impermissible foreign one, and conversely how far in the background foreign
legal sources can be without “polluting” an otherwise domestic legal principle
with impermissible foreign content.295 The prospects for confusion about what
may and may not be considered by state courts under such an AFIL regime seem
substantial.296
5. Unenforceability
There may well be another circumstance motivating AFIL provisions. Voters
and legislators likely do not want state courts, when considering an unresolved
issue of domestic law, to be influenced by decisions of comparable questions by
foreign courts.297 This has been the chief objection to the use of foreign law in
the U.S. constitutional sphere.298 For example, when U.S. exceptionalists object
to references to foreign and international law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions
regarding the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, 299 they typically argue that the Supreme Court should pay no
regard to what forms of punishment foreign nations allow and disallow.300 They
also claim that foreign decisions on matters such as gay rights, marriage equality,
affirmative action, or other human rights questions ought to be irrelevant to U.S.
constitutional adjudication on similar issues.301 Supporters of AFIL provisions
may want to forestall any risk that state courts will be similarly influenced by
foreign law principles on similar questions.302
295. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1 (noting that AFIL statutes “are so broadly phrased”
which “could result in years of litigation as state courts struggle to construe what these laws actually
mean . . . .”).
296. This problem will be particularly acute with laws emanating from other common law
jurisdictions, but it will exist with respect to law from other non-common-law nations as well,
particularly as overlaps in areas of public law, business law, environmental law, and administrative
regulation converge through globalization.
297. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1410–11 (2006).
298. See id. (noting that “the popular culture of the United States is extremely hostile to the
idea that the meaning of our Constitution should be based in any way on foreign law.”).
299. See id. at 1413; see also Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts: Could it
Jeopardize American Constitutional Rights?, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/01/23/foreign-law-inamerican-courts-can-it-jeopardize-american-constitutional-rights/.
300. See Calabresi, supra note 297, at 1413.
301. E.g., id. at 1398, 1411. (arguing that the exceptional nature of the U.S. legal system makes
comparison to other legal system frequently irrelevant).
302. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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As to federal questions that come before the state courts, any state law that
attempts to proscribe reference to all such foreign or international legal resources
is probably unenforceable. In the arenas in which federal law–whether by
statute, treaty, constitutional principle, or authoritative federal court decision–
incorporates, requires, or encourages the consideration or application of foreign
law, state legislatures should be powerless to prohibit it. 303 In these
circumstances, if foreign law bears on the interpretation and application of
federal law, the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to use it.304 As Testa v.
Katt 305 held, where a state court is competent to hear a claim or defense
involving federal law, it is obligated to treat that claim in the same way and with
the same force as any federal court would. 306 What federal law requires is
binding on the state court and cannot be ignored.307 If federal law is based on,
or calls for application of, foreign or international legal rules or principles, state
courts that otherwise possess capacity to decide the matter in question should be
obliged to apply those rules or principles in their adjudication.308
Additionally, where federal statutes or treaties incorporate and apply
international law, those principles become part of the national legal edifice that
binds state courts.309 State law prohibiting reliance on foreign or international
principles with respect to that portion of federal law would be unenforceable
under the doctrine of federal preemption.310
As to purely state law questions, formal proscription of resort to foreign law
is permissible but is subject to dilution or evasion through legal interpretation.311
While it may be possible to prohibit courts from citing foreign law for state law
purposes, it seems virtually impossible, without kinds of surveillance that would
seriously threaten judicial independence, to prevent a judge from consulting
foreign sources.312 Where a foreign rule has a U.S. cognate or overlaps with
existing U.S. law, it should be relatively easy for courts to avoid the appearance
of reliance on foreign law by simply reading the same content into U.S. law

303. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 113.
304. Id.
305. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
306. Id. at 392–93.
307. See id.
308. See Fellmeth, supra note 203, at 113.
309. See id.
310. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (the basis for federal preemption stems from the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution); see also Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (quoting
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)) (“Consistent with [the Supremacy Clause], we
have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are ‘without effect.’”).
311. Cf. Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 243 (noting that AFIL state statutes are “not
harmful . . . but neither are they particularly useful” because they will not prevent a court from
constitutional violations).
312. See Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637, 675 (2007).
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counterparts.313 A judge who was persuaded by foreign law might, without ever
admitting the true source of his or her thinking, “convert” the foreign rule or
principle into an ostensibly domestic one by simply “interpreting” an existing,
and sufficiently general, domestic legal rule or principle to include the same
content as the foreign source.314 Even the late Justice Antonin Scalia, who was
the most ardent exceptionalist on the Supreme Court prior to this death,
acknowledged that his colleagues must be left free to “look” at foreign law,
although he preferred that they refrain from “citing” or relying on it directly.315
Such a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to foreign law, however, invites a kind
of judicial subterfuge that is inconsistent with U.S. concepts of judicial power.316
Part of what we expect from the courts is that they will openly and transparently
acknowledge the sources and grounds for their decisions.317 The public expects
the courts to give the real reasons for their decisions, and to put those reasons on
a public record that opens them to evaluation and criticism by higher courts,
legislators, the legal profession, and the public at large.318 Legal rules that invite
the judiciary to hide or disguise what they are actually doing are inconsistent
with this tradition.319

313. Id. at 651 (highlighting that Chief Justice Roberts encouraged judges that utilized foreign
law “‘to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, [and] cloak them with the authority of
precedent.’”).
314. Id. at 655–56, 658.
315. The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation
Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 541 (2005).
316. See Parrish, supra note 312, at 650 (highlighting that applying foreign law “invites ‘judges
to ‘troll deeply . . . in the world’s corpus juris’ to reach a politically preferred outcome’” which is
inconsistent with the proper role of the judiciary system).
317. See Id. at 674–75.
The U.S. Supreme Court should cautiously continue to cite to foreign law because an
essential part of judging is citing to authority that the justices use to arrive at their
decisions. Our legal system is imbued with the tradition that judges must justify their
holdings. In doing so, they must be candid and honest in revealing the sources, and
stating the reasons, for their decisions. Transparency is important. The public is entitled
to know why the Court ruled a particular way and to be provided the opportunity to
subject the reasoning to scrutiny.
Id.; The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation
Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 315, at 540 (quoting Justice
Breyer as saying, “If the foreign materials have had a significant impact on my thinking, they may
belong in the opinion because an opinion should be transparent. It should reflect my actual
thinking.”). See generally Edward H. Levi, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
395 (1965).
318. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman, & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District
Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 727 (2007) (discussing the importance of written
opinions in ascertaining judicial reasoning); see also Levi, supra note 317, at 406–07. See generally
William Domnarski, Judges Should Write Their Own Opinions, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/opinion/judges-should-write-their-own-opinions.html
(arguing for the importance of the written, published judicial opinions in U.S. jurisprudence).
319. See Parrish, supra note 312, at 674–75.
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6. The Effects of Globalization.
Presumably, if judges are commanded by statute not to look at foreign law in
the state law cases before them, most responsible judges will attempt in good
faith to abide by the command, rather than try to evade it.320 But as time goes
on the pressures on courts to find ways of incorporating foreign legal matters
into their judicial decisions will inevitably increase.321 The reason is the rapidly
accelerating pace of legal globalization.322
Consider Oklahoma, the state where the AFIL movement began.323 There
may have been a time in the not too distant past when states such as Oklahoma
were sufficiently commercially and socially isolated so that foreign law had
minimal impact on the legal lives of their citizens. The beginning of this article
quoted some famous lyrics from the Broadway musical, Oklahoma!, which was
set at about the time of Oklahoma’s statehood in 1907.324 One of the songs in
the musical whimsically treated nearby Kansas City, Missouri as far-away and
culturally foreign to the denizens of the soon-to-be Sooner state, 325 though
intriguingly for the present discussion the musical also featured energetic local
commercial enterprise by a Middle Eastern immigrant.326 Perhaps Oklahoma
was pretty isolated back then. But today, with the global networks of
communication, transportation, and trade that are presently enjoyed, even a
landlocked heartland state, such as Oklahoma, is rife with international and
foreign contacts. 327 With global contact comes global legal interaction and
cross-fertilization.328 With interaction and cross-fertilization come transnational
legal disputes.329
On the commercial side, even modest local businesses in Oklahoma are likely
in the twenty-first century to have foreign partners, investors, suppliers,

320. See id. at 664–65.
321. See id. at 679–80.
322. See Leonard Bierman & Michael A. Hitt, The Globalization of Legal Practice in the
Internet Age, 14 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 29, 34 (2007); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, National
Jurisdiction and Global Business Networks, Earl A. Snyder Lecture in International Law, 17 IND.
J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 165, 166 (2010); Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World is Flat: Globalization and
Its Effect on Lawyers Practicing in Non-Global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 527, 532
(2008); William D. Henderson, The Globalization of the Legal Profession, 14 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (2007); D. Daniel Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a
Research Agenda for Future Study, 14 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 5, 21 (2007); Laurel S. Terry, U.S.
Legal Ethics: The Coming of Age of Global and Comparative Perspectives, 4 WASH. U. GLOB.
STUD. L. REV. 463, 484 (2005).
323. See PATEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 1.
324. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN & RICHARD RODGERS,
Oklahoma! (1943).
325. Oscar Hammerstein & Richard Roger, Oklahoma! 8–9, Act 1, Scene 1 (1943).
326. Id. at “Cast of Characters.”
327. E.g., Wilson, supra note 218, at 887.
328. See id. at 888.
329. Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 37, 38 (1993).
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customers, competitors, and employees.330 These businesses are likely to enter
into contracts with foreign entities, buy or sell property or services with foreign
entities, advertise in foreign markets, ship goods to foreign destinations, import
goods from foreign sources, engage in business activities that subject them to
foreign regulations and legal duties, pay foreign taxes, communicate throughout
the world, and otherwise engage in global business activities.331
On the social side, the state is likely to have citizens who travel extensively to
foreign destinations, enter into various domestic legal relations abroad, buy or
sell or own or dispose of foreign property, have foreign tax and other legal
obligations, engage in transnational consumer transactions, commit foreign
crimes, and communicate internationally. 332 There will also be numerous
foreign individuals who come to Oklahoma as tourists, on visas for various
business purposes, as students at universities in Oklahoma, and as legal residents
living and working in Oklahoma.333 Other people will “enter” the state virtually
through various internet communications and transactions.334
These kinds of foreign interactions have no doubt increased exponentially
over the past two or three decades. These interactions will increase even more
rapidly in the next several decades. Unlike its portrayal in the musical, modern
Oklahoma is not simply about cowboys and farmers anymore, although today
even cowboys and farmers have extensive webs of global contact.335
In the face of such rampant global activity, legal disputes that contain one or
more components of foreign or international law are sure to occur, to increase in
number and potential complexity, and to do so rapidly.336 When they do, the
330. E.g., Buxbaum, supra note 322, at 165–66.
331. Indeed, the University of Oklahoma’s business school, Price College of Business, pays
particular attention to the area of international business. See About Price, THE UNIV. OF OKLA.:
PRICE C. OF BUS., http://www.ou.edu/content/price/about_price.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
The school proudly announces on its website that the school is in its 11th consecutive year in the top
30 international business programs nationwide. Id.
332. E.g., Bierman & Hitt, supra note 322, at 30; Passports, OKLA. CTY.,
http://www.oklahomacounty.org/courtclerk/PassportOffice.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
333. A 2010 survey identified 5.5% of the Oklahoman population (roughly 206,000 people) as
foreign born. Selected Characteristics of the Foreign-Born Population by Period of Entry into the
United States: 2010 American Community Survey 1–Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF (last visited
Jan. 20, 2016). In 2011, 8,722 international students enrolled in Oklahoma colleges and
universities, and that number continues to increase annually. Silas Allen, International Student
Enrollment Increases in Oklahoma, Nationwide, NEWS OK (Nov. 13, 2012), http://newsok.com/
international-student-enrollment-increases-in-oklahoma-nationwide/article/3728545.
Additionally, as of 2012, Oklahoma ranked 25th in the nation in terms of the number of international
university students. Id.
334. E.g., Bierman & Hitt, supra note 322, at 30.
335. As evidence of this, even small cattle farmer publications now include news on
international affairs. See On the Global Ag Front, THE CATTLE BUS. WKLY (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.cattlebusinessweekly.com/Content/Headlines/-Headlines/Article/On-the-Global-AgFront/1/1/6061.
336. E.g., Shapiro, supra note 329, at 38.
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people and businesses of the state, or foreign individuals working and living in
the state, will naturally seek recourse to the state’s courts for adjudication of at
least some of these legal disputes.337 If the state courts are prohibited from
considering relevant foreign and international law, local litigants will find
themselves at a significant disadvantage. 338 They will be forced either to
navigate around the limits on the local courts’ capacity to take foreign law into
account, or to go elsewhere to litigate their foreign-law-containing disputes.339
Either option is likely to be costly and cumbersome to the litigants, particularly
the ones who are denizens of Oklahoma.340 Either option will also undermine
the power and capacity of the state court system to serve the community’s legal
interests and needs.341
Collectively, these pernicious consequences of the AFIL statutes significantly
outweigh their supposed anticipatory, prophylactic benefits. Even where
wholesale exceptionalism is constitutional, it is unwise and should be rejected as
an unnecessary and potentially harmful interference with state judicial power.
III. SELECTIVE EXCEPTIONALISM
Although wholesale U.S. legal exceptionalism of the type embodied in the
current round of AFIL statutes and proposals is misguided, the concept of U.S.
legal exceptionalism should not be dismissed in its entirety. To the contrary,
U.S. law and the U.S. legal experience are indeed exceptional in many important
respects. There are important places in U.S. law where one should be able to
rely at least partly on exceptionalist reasoning as a basis for deliberate
differentiation between U.S. legal principles and those of other nations with
which we share common legal ground.
Ironically, one prominent example is the matter of separation between church
and state, the very issue on which Oklahoma’s AFIL provision foundered.342

337. See Davis, supra note 54, at 651.
338. Id. at 643–44.
339. Id. at 648.
340. Walter Jenny Jr., State Question is Xenophobic, THE EDMOND SUN (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.edmondsun.com/opinion/state-question-is-xenophobic/article_3b12d6ae-886b-5341a9cc-a0b2c500ebaa.html?mode=print.
341. See, e.g., id.
342. See, e.g., Dr. Sophie C. van Bijsterveld, Church and State in Western Europe and the
United States: Principles and Perspectives, 2000 BYU L. REV. 989, at 993–94 (2000) (observing
that the “Jeffersonian” approach to religious freedom embodied in the idea of a “‘Wall of
Separation’” between church and state has no real equivalent in western Europe, even in countries
with a separation of church and state. The Netherlands, France, Ireland, and Portugal could not be
qualified in such rigorous terms. Even if the actual situation may be more complex and
differentiated, in the United States the phrase ‘Wall of Separation’ seems to have a strong and
positive ideological charge); Elisabeth Zoller, Laïcité in the United States or the Separation of
Church and State in a Pluralist Society, 13 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 561, 592 (2006).
Understood as the principle of the separation of church and state, laïcité operates in the
United States in an infinitely harder and more rigid manner than in France. The American
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Although many world constitutional orders purport to protect religious
freedom, 343 few, if any, include the kind of strong restrictions on the legal
relations between government and religion that have developed in U.S.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The long United States historical and
social experience of wide diversity in faith, coupled with legal traditions and
cultural attitudes forged in reaction to Europe’s disastrous Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Century wars of religion, plus the United States’ firm commitment
to individual freedom of thought and belief, collectively have produced an
historically strong strain of commitment to secular government in the United
States.344 That tradition began before nationhood, is embodied in the language
of the Constitution,345 is reflected in every state constitution,346 and has been
developed and applied through two centuries of energetic constitutional
jurisprudence. 347 Efforts to soften those commitments based on foreign law
ought to be opposed, even though other constitutional democracies which share
our general commitment to religious freedom often tolerate far more intersection
conception of the separation of church and state requires that the federal government be a
federal state of neutrality without concessions, without privileges, and without amenities.
Id.
343. See, e.g., AUSTL. CONST. s. 116 (“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for
establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or
public trust under the Commonwealth”); Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“The State and the
Catholic Church are independent and sovereign, each within its own sphere.”); CONST. (1987), art.
III, sec. 5 (Phil.) (“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights”); TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI MADDE 10 (Turkey) (the
founding principles of the Republic of Turkey are secularism, social equality, and equality before
law).
344. See generally Edwin Scott Gaustad, The Emergence of Religious Freedom in the Early
Republic, in RELIGION AND STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 25–27 (James E. Wood,
ed., Baylor Univ. Press, 1985); Leonard Levy, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment, in RELIGION AND STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 44–53
(James E. Wood, ed., Baylor Univ. Press, 1985); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM
131-35 (Beacon Press, 1953).
345. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”); id. art. VI, cl. 3 (“no religious test shall ever
be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.”).
346. See State Constitution, THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ARCHIVE, http://churchstatelaw.com/
stateconstitutions/index.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (providing a complete database of the
religious freedom clauses of every state constitution).
347. See, e.g., E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114
PENN. ST. L. REV. 485, 494 (2009).
[T]he rationales for religious toleration that emerged from sixteenth and seventeenth
century England and Europe . . . formed the historical context and theoretical foundation
for the American achievement of religious freedom. That achievement is the offspring of
the bitter struggle against persecution and the fierce intellectual controversies that arose
out of the divisions created by the Protestant Reformation.
Id.
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between church and state than U.S. legal principles typically permit.348 While
the consideration of other nations’ religious freedom precedent and legal
practice should not be banned, much of it is likely to be inapplicable to U.S. law
as a consequence of the unique character of U.S. church-state relations.
If wholesale exceptionalism is unwise, but it is still sometimes appropriate to
claim that exceptional characteristics set our laws apart, it follows that a
principled basis is necessary for exercising subject-specific exceptionalist
limitations on resort to foreign law. To establish such a principled framework,
objective criteria for selective exceptionalism need to be developed. Where and
how is it right and proper for U.S. exceptionalism to be invoked as a principle
barring use of foreign law? Where and when should exceptionalist claims be
contested? And how is a system of selective exceptionalism to be squared with
a constitutional commitment to the rule of law?
These issues are not unique to the United States. Most nations with durable
and stable constitutional democratic governments can make their own
exceptionalist claims.349 Consider, for example, the constitutional democracies
around the world that share elements of the U.K. common law tradition. 350
Besides the United Kingdom, they include the United States, Canada, Australia,
India, Ireland, and South Africa.351 Thanks to their common legal heritage, these
nations share many common legal structures and adhere to many common legal
principles, both constitutionally and in terms of their public and private law.352
They are among the nations whose laws U.S. courts would be most likely to find
practically useful and needed resources. 353 Yet the social, cultural,
demographic, geographical, religious, and political histories of these nations are
348. Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the
Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU L. REV. 467, 468–69 (2001) (noting that while
“almost all countries formerly had a state church” in Europe, over time “the official relationship
between church and state eventually broke down” although this change “does not foreclose the
existence of some churches remaining closer to the state than other religious organizations or
groups”).
349. Specific forms of national exceptionalism can be observed in many nations. For example,
in France agencies such as the “L’Académie française” have been instituted to protect the purity of
French language and culture. See ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE, http://www.academie-francaise.fr (last
visited Aug. 10, 2014). Germany identifies with a form of exceptionalism known as “Sonderweg”
(the “special path” of the German nation See John R. Hinde, Sonderweg (Special Path), in MODERN
GERMANY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, PEOPLE AND CULTURE 1871–1990 934–35 (Dieter
K. Buse and Juergen Doerr 1998). Japan exhibits a form of national exceptionalism called
“Nihonjinron,” which is essentially a comprehensive view on Japanese cultural identity. Suzanne
M. Sable, Pride Prejudice, and Japan’s Unified State, 11 UDC L. REV. 71, 71 (2008).
350. See, e.g., The Common Law and Civil Traditions, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCH. OF
LAW (BOALT HALL), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLaw
Traditions.html.
351. The World Factbook: Field Listing: Legal System, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html.
352. See id.
353. E.g., The Common Law and Civil Traditions, supra note 350; The World Factbook: Field
Listing: Legal System, supra note 351.
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vitally different. 354 In each instance, those differences have contributed to
specific differences in law that set each nation apart from the others in legally
important ways.355 While the courts of many of these nations seem less troubled
than the U.S. Supreme Court about the propriety of consulting outside legal
sources, 356 they still must decide whether, when, where, and how to set
appropriate limits on the use and influence of foreign or international judgments,
in the name of preserving essential elements of domestic law that are grounded
on exceptional national experience.357

354. Cf. The World Factbook: Field Listing: Legal System, supra note 351.
355. Cf. id.
356. The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG, Constitutional Law and International Law: National
Exceptionalism and the Democratic Deficit?, 98 GEO. L.J. 433, 435–36 (2010).
In some countries with constitutional documents more recent than those of the United
States or Australia, provisions have been incorporated that expressly enjoin the local
courts, with constitutional authority, to pay regard to international law in discharging
their municipal functions. Thus the Indian Constitution in Article 51(c) requires the State
to endeavour to ‘foster respect for international law.’ The South African Constitution
uses somewhat stronger terms. Both in its interim form of 1993 and in its post-apartheid
provisions of 1996, it adopts an internationalist methodology. Section 39(1) specifically
requires the Constitutional Court of South Africa to have regard for international law
when giving meaning to the South African Bill of Rights. Moreover, in other matters,
the same subsection provides that the court ‘may consider foreign law.’
Id.; Adam Liptak, U.S. Supreme Court’s Global Influence is Waning, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/world/americas/17iht-18legal.16249317.html?
pagewanted=all (“American constitutional law has been cited and discussed in countless decisions
of courts in Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa and
elsewhere.”); D. M. Davis, Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal Culture and Local
History in the Reconstitution of Comparative Influence: The South African Experience, 1 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 181, 186–88 (2003) (noting that the recently developed South African Constitution
contains numerous provisions and rights modeled after or copied from the constitutions of the
United States, Canada, Germany, and Malaysia).
357. Because they are less resistant to consideration and discussion of foreign precedent,
decisions of constitutional courts outside the United States have some experience in weighing the
relevance of foreign precedent. For this reason, they are a potential source for developing principles
guiding selective exceptionalism. See Truth About Motorways Pty. Ltd. v. Macquarie
Infrastructure Inv. Mgmt. Ltd. (2000) HCA 11, para. 32-33 (Austl.) (looking to U.S. Supreme Court
cases to resolve a question of standing under the Australian Constitution); Austl. Conservation
Found. v. The Commonwealth (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493, para. 20 (Austl.) (discussing and analyzing
major U.S. Supreme Court cases on standing); Amalgamated Soc’y of Eng’rs v. Adelaide S.S. Co.
Ltd. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 146-48 (Austl.) (noting that the differences between the foundations and
history of Australia and the United States make reliance on U.S. federalism cases futile); State v.
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 56 (S. Afr.).
The United States jurisprudence has not resolved the dilemma arising from the fact that
the Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, but . . . contemplates that there
will be capital punishment . . . The difficulties that have been experienced in following
this path . . . persuade me that we should not follow this route.
Id.; HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2009] para. 27-29 (Isr.)
(holding, after examining the steps taken by the Israeli Defense Forces during a large-scale military
operation in the Gaza Strip, that the IDF had complied with international law); R. v. Hape, [2007]
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This Article does not pretend to offer a thoroughly worked out set of answers
to these questions. What it does present are some working hypotheses that are
intended to suggest the direction that development of a mature theory of
selective exceptionalism ought to take.
A. The Contrast between Wholesale and Selective Exceptionalism
The chief flaw in the current round of AFIL statutes and proposals is the
attempt many of them make to block all, or nearly all, access to foreign or
international law within the legal domain of state adjudication, without regard to
degrees of potential relevance. But rejection of such wholesale exceptionalism
does not require rejection of a more selective approach. Legal exception is not
always justified, but it is appropriate in some, perhaps even many, cases. Instead
of a broad proscription on consideration of any foreign or international law, what
is needed is a process to determine on an issue-by-issue level what foreign and
international law is relevant, and what is not.
Indeed, wholesale and selective exceptionalism are based on diametrically
different perspectives toward foreign and international law.358 By categorically
denying the relevance of all foreign and international material from particular
jurisdictions, the wholesale approach actively precludes any consideration of
foreign sources.359 In contrast, the selective version actively invites and even
potentially necessitates consideration of foreign and international law. This
difference in perspective arises because under a selective approach, it is not
possible to decide whether or not foreign or international legal sources are
relevant without first determining what it is they say, whether what they say
bears on the issues in the legal proceeding or dispute, and if so in what ways.360
2 S.C.R. 292, 313–16 (Can.) (reaffirming that rules of international law have force of law in
Canada).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 1-70..
359. Id.
360. A selective approach is visible in many foreign judicial systems. See, e.g., HCJ 7957/04
Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Isr., 106(2) PD 201, 20-21 [2005] (Isr.) (stating, in a decision
considering the legitimacy of the separation wall between Israel and the West Bank:
[W]e need not, in the framework of the petition before us, take a position regarding the
force of the international conventions on human rights in the area. Nor shall we examine
the interrelationship between international humanitarian law and international law on
human rights . . . However, we shall assume – without deciding the matter – that the
international conventions on human rights apply in the area.
Id.; Al Kateb v. Goodwin, (2004) HCA 37, para. 62–70 (Austl.) (featuring debate about role of
international law in Australian constitutional interpretation); Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 (5) S.A.
401 (CC), at para. 35–40 (S. Afr.) (exploring conflicts between defamation cases in Canada,
Germany, Australia, and the United States to analyze whether an action for defamation requires a
showing that the statement was false); State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) S.A. 391 (CC) para. 38, 40,
60, 151 (S. Afr.) (declaring the death penalty unconstitutional in South Africa after considering the
laws of numerous nations in its rationale); State v. Williams, 1995 (3) S.A. 362 (CC) para. 32–33,
96 (S. Afr.) (holding that juvenile whipping has been characterized throughout the world as a
degrading and violent form of punishment and therefore abolishing the practice to fall in line with
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Consequently, while wholesale exceptionalism promotes denial of foreign and
international sources, selective exceptionalism promotes interaction.361
In order to decide selectively whether foreign or international law is relevant
to a legal question, one must first consider what the foreign law is, how it relates
to domestic law, how it relates to the facts and issues in the case, and whether
there are grounds for either bringing foreign and domestic law together or
keeping them apart. One must, in other words, actively engage with foreign or
international law, taking it into account before deciding whether or not it has a
bearing on the domestic legal question.362 In contrast, categorical across-theboard rejection of an entire body of foreign or international law prohibits even
preliminary assessment of its relevance. 363 In other words, wholesale
exceptionalism denies the applicability of outside legal sources ex ante, while
selective exceptionalism, when it does deny the relevance of outside sources,
does so only ex post.364
The wholesale and ex ante character of categorical exceptionalism makes it
subject to special dangers that are less salient in the selective model. Wholesale
exceptionalism risks collapse into either nativist insularity or legal nationalism,
or both. 365 These dangers arise in part because a claim of national
international consensus). See generally James Allan, Grant Huscroft & Nessa Lynch, The Citation
of Overseas Authority in Rights Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11
OTAGO L. REV. 433, 434, 437–38 (2007); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, A Tool, Not a Master: The
Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 1188, 1208–09
(2001); Lyonette Louis-Jacques, New Rights-New Laws: Legal Information In A Changing World
Wide Web, 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 474, 474–75 (2004).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 1-70.
362. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 128 (2005) [hereinafter Jackson, Constitutional
Comparisons] (advocating an “engagement” model of comparative constitutional law which
consists of “issue-by-issue analysis and does not necessarily mean adoption, but thoughtful, wellinformed consideration” of foreign law); Koh, International Law, supra note 229, at 53 (urging the
development of a “transnationalist jurisprudence,” which includes “understanding and making
reference to foreign constitutional precedents” as an aid to constitutional interpretation); AnneMarie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 195 (2003) (arguing
that international dialogue proceeds through “increasingly direct interactions[,]” which “both
contribute to a nascent global jurisprudence on particular issues and improve the quality of
particular national decisions, sometimes by importing ideas and sometimes by insisting on an
idiosyncratic national approach for specific cultural, historical, or political reasons”); Mark
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999)
(suggesting that “U.S. courts can sometimes gain insights into the appropriate interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution by a cautious and careful analysis of constitutional experience elsewhere.”).
363. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
364. See supra Section III.A. through infra note 369.
365. See Andrew Kohut & Bruce Stokes, supra note 259 (exploring the link between American
exceptionalist attitudes and U.S. nationalism, as well as the negative effects these attitudes can have
on an international level); Minxin Pei, The Paradoxes of American Nationalism, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Nov. 2, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/02/the-paradoxes-of-american-nationalism/
(broadly discussing the backlash against American nationalism); Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold
Rush-Part I: Hamdi, 9/11 and the Dark Side of American Enlightenment, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV.
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exceptionalism is so easily invoked.366 Every nation has a unique political and
cultural history.367 Thus, any nation, at any juncture, can assert unique historical
and political experiences that allegedly distinguish it from the rest of the
world. 368 Exclusively stressing these differences tends to reinforce domestic
nationalist strains of thought.369 Claims that “we’re different” or “our law is
different” all too easily metamorphose into claims that “we’re better” or “our
law is better,” which in turn reinforce nativist identity politics and a nationalist
political agenda.370 The stress of difference also tends to promote isolation—a
“do-it-ourselves” attitude about the law. 371 In the United States, this strain
correlates with a national conviction of the virtues of rugged and self-reliant
independence that is also deeply woven into the fabric of our national
narrative.372
Yet to stress only national differences, without recognizing potential
similarities with other nations, is to do justice to only one part of one’s national
story. Just as there are differences with other nations that find their expression
in law, there are also significant commonalities, shared legal commitments, and
shared legal traditions.
Consider, for example, the United States and Australia. 373 Both are
constitutional democracies.374 Both follow a federal constitutional structure.375
341, 345–46 n.14 (2007) (arguing that exceptionalist attitudes have led to fevered American
nationalism in the form of military aggression and disregard for the human rights of enemy
combatants).
366. See, e.g., Kohut & Stokes, supra note 259.
367. See generally The World Factbook: Field Listing: Legal System, supra note 351.
368. See supra note 356.
369. See, e.g., Pei, supra note 365.
370. See supra note 365.
371. See Kohut & Stokes, supra note 259.
372. The first use of the term “rugged individualism” has been attributed to President Herbert
Hoover in a 1928 presidential campaign speech and refers to a belief that individuals can succeed
with minimal governmental aid. Herbert Hoover, Presidential Campaign Speech (Oct. 22, 1928)
(transcript available at http://www.pinzler.com/ushistory/ruggedsupp.html); see also Roger
Rosenblatt, Essay: The Rugged Individual Rides Again, TIME (Oct. 15, 1984),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,923739-1,00.html (“Everyone always says that
rugged individualism is the backbone, and the jawbone, of America; that a country as grand and
sturdy as this could only have been built by the self-propelled and self-interested strivings of wildeyed nonconformists, each fur-laden Daniel Boone pursuing his independent errand into the
wilderness.”); Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 377 (2002) (“Unionization, of course, is a
matter of collective action. The dominant American self-image, in contrast, is squarely grounded in
the cult of the individual.”).
373. See generally Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law,
13 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 37, 41–43 (2006) (providing a broad comparison and contrast of the
American and Australian common law systems).
374. See The World Factbook: Field Listing: Legal System, supra note 351; see also Saunders,
supra note 373, at 44–45.
375. See Saunders, supra note 373, at 44–45.
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Both share the U.K. common law tradition, producing substantial commonality
in such areas of law as torts, contracts, and property, as well as judicial
process. 376 The two nations make similar commitments to the rights of the
accused, and their civil and criminal courts function in procedurally similar
ways. 377 They share many national and international human rights
commitments.378 Yet there are also key differences.379 Australia is part of the
British Commonwealth and recognizes the British Monarchy. 380 Its national
constitution lacks a bill of rights.381 It follows a parliamentary governmental
structure. 382 Its courts are much more aggressive about incorporating
international law principles into domestic adjudication.383 Both nations have
struggled with race relations, but in different social and historical contexts.384
The United States has struggled with the profound social and legal issues
surrounding enslavement and racial segregation, while in Australia problems of
race have been deeply intertwined with issues of aboriginal rights and culture.385
These are just a few of the many important legal differences between the two
nations. Doubtless, those differences are reflected in important ways in their
respective laws. But so are the similarities.
In comparable fashion, insisting on isolated self-sufficiency denies the
emerging realities of a global economy and society that are rapidly breaking
down national barriers, producing substantially increased legal interaction and
legal convergence, especially in areas of corporate and commercial law. 386
376. See The World Factbook: Field Listing: Legal System, supra note 351.
377. E.g., Saunders, supra note 373, at 44–45.
378. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
379. See Saunders, supra note 373, at 44-45.
380. Queen and Australia, THE BRITISH MONARCHY, http://www.royal.gov.uk/monarch
andcommonwealth/australia/australia.aspx.
381. Saunders, supra note 373, at 44.
382. E.g., id. at 45.
383. See Saunders, supra note 373, at 41–42 (arguing that Australia’s common law courts more
openly observe comparative law than U.S. courts); Nicholas Aroney, Comparative Law in
Australian Constitutional Jurisprudence, 26 U. OF QUEENSL. L.J. 317, 319 (2007) (finding that the
High Court of Australia is more open to looking to comparative law in its constitutional rulings than
the U.S. Supreme Court).
384. Brown v. Board at Fifty: “With an Even Hand”: A Century of Racial Segregation, 18491950, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-segregation.html
(hereinafter “Brown v. Board at Fifty”); David Hollinsworth, Racism and Indigenous People in
Australia, 12 GLOBAL DIALOGUE (2010), http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=484.
385. Brown v. Board at Fifty, supra note 384; Hollinsworth, supra note 384.
386. See Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, The Paradox of Legal Harmonization, 132
PUB. CHOICE 367, 368–69 (2007) (discussing the various manners in which nations can harmonize
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Wholesale ex ante exceptionalism exaggerates the differences without
adequately valuing the similarities, intersections, and convergences. 387 By
doing so, it artificially distorts the collective national legal narrative.388 It does
so, moreover, in ways that press toward legal isolation from the rest of the world,
or support an impulse to dominate it by imposing domestic legal rules on all
actors and transactions.389 As worldwide political and military lessons from the
last century demonstrate, if carried to extremes either tendency risks profound
negative consequences.390
Wholesale exceptionalism also fails to account for the increasingly wide turf
of legal common ground that most modern constitutional democracies share,391
as well as the breadth of legal internationalization that has occurred in U.S.
domestic law as a necessary consequence of economic globalization.392 As a
functional matter, due to globalization of business and economic behavior, it is

their laws with other nations in order to better accommodate international commerce); Claudio
Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered
Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 9–10 (1993).
Such recent developments as . . . the increasing integration of national economies into a
global economy have dramatically increased the pressure on international law to respond
to the expansion of international legal issues and actors. These developments challenge
international law to either adapt its key principles, such as sovereignty, to these new
realities, or to develop new principles that more adequately reflect the world in which
international law must operate.
Id.
387. See, e.g., MICHAEL BURLEIGH, THE THIRD REICH: A NEW HISTORY 12 (Hill & Wang
2000).
388. E.g., id.
389. E.g., id.
390. See, e.g., id. (discussing the role of isolationism and nationalism in contributing to WWI
and WWII, specifically in Germany).
391. See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 39 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998) (noting the basic rule of comparativism is that
“different legal systems give the same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same
problems of life, despite the great differences in their historical development, conceptual structure,
and style of operation”); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 254 (2001) (“A number of
constitutional systems around the world now have judicially enforceable protections of freedom of
expression, equality of treatment, human liberty, and freedom from inhumane punishments.”).
392. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Declaration, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (providing basic protections for
intellectual property in an international context); Convention on Nuclear Safety, June 17, 1994,
1963 U.N.T.S. 293, 317; Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (committing to the reduction of greenhouse
gases); North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057
(creating a trilateral trade bloc in North America); Marrakesh Declaration: Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (regulating the rules of
international trade); United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 59.
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increasingly difficult to discern where international or foreign law ends and
domestic law begins.
For example, imagine a legal dispute in Oklahoma over a contract between a
U.S. firm and an Australian firm that contains a choice of law clause electing
Australian contract law. Are the interpretation and enforcement of that clause
by a U.S. court expressions of the U.S. legal principle favoring contractual
choice of law,393 or do they involve the sort of resort to foreign law that an AFIL
statute renders impermissible? Does the answer depend on whether the
Australian law in question has a similar content to U.S. law because it derives
from a similar common law source? What about a contract that refers to
industrial or labor standards set by an international body, or that contains
promises to adhere to the requirements of an international environmental treaty?
Can local courts interpret and enforce these contract provisions? What about a
tort action between an Oklahoma resident and an Australian party in which,
because of the location of the tort, Oklahoma choice of law principles would
ordinarily lead to the application of Australian tort law? Is following such a
choice of law rule forbidden? Courts in states with AFIL statutes will face the
unenviable task of finding answers to such perplexing questions.394 Depending
on what those answers are, moreover, business entities and potential litigants
may find it prudent to find ways of avoiding, prohibiting, or circumventing
access to those courts. One possible result could be the diminution of
transnational business and commerce in Oklahoma, to the economic detriment
of the people in that state.
While the challenge of drawing the line between domestic and foreign or
international law may be less severe in the constitutional realm, blocking access
to foreign sources partly misapprehends the character of constitutional
inquiry. 395 The challenge of constitutional interpretation often involves
determining how a generally shared and fairly uniformly articulated
constitutional norm, such as equality, freedom of expression, or fair process,
should apply to an emergent and previously unfamiliar or unexamined
situation.396 Where the underlying constitutional norm is shared and has been
393. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW. INST.
1971).
394. E.g., Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 235. A related issue is whether U.S. federal
courts, hearing cases under federal diversity jurisdiction, must also refrain from any reliance on
foreign law in cases to which the law of Oklahoma applies. Although an Oklahoma AFIL statute
clearly would not bind federal courts directly, the federal courts’ obligation to conform the
substantive rules of decision under federal diversity jurisdiction to those of applicable state law
might require a federal court to observe the state’s dictates regarding foreign law when sitting in
diversity.
395. See generally Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and
Strategy of Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 301, 303–04 (2004);
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 820–21 (1999).
396. See generally Annus, supra note 395, at 303–04; Choudhry, supra note 395, at 820–21.
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articulated in different legal systems through comparable legal standards,
differences in national experience that concern the formation or adoption of the
norm are relatively unlikely to produce national differences in interpretation.397
The nations that share commitment to the norm all came to the same juncture,
even if by different roads.398
Rather, legal differences between nations are more likely to stem from
differences in the relative intensity of national commitment to the shared norm,
or from differences in contemporary social or cultural context that affect the
expression of the norm in action.399 The relevance of exceptionalism depends
on its capacity to illuminate these differences in the contemporary political,
legal, or cultural settings that distinguish one national experience from another
and thus affect the operative scope or application of the shared principle in a
particular context.400 Where such differences can be demonstrated, an appeal to
exceptionalism is available to support an alternative legal outcome. 401 But
where the norms are common, the intensity of commitment to them is roughly
the same, and the factual and cultural circumstances in which the issues arise
are not demonstrably different in ways that matter, a foreign resolution of the
issue ought to be relevant as a potential guide for analysis of the common legal
problem.402
The relevance of the foreign principle, however, does not equate with its
actual application.403 When a domestic U.S. court considers a foreign principle
or decision, finds it relevant, determines that it is at least partly persuasive, and
incorporates that insight into the resolution of the legal dispute before it, the
result is not an application of foreign law, or the delegation of the outcome to a

397. See generally Annus, supra note 395, at 303–04; Choudhry, supra note 395, at 820–21.
398. See generally Annus, supra note 395; Choudhry, supra note 395 (both providing
discussions on international legal norms creation).
399. See generally Annus, supra note 395, at 348 (“Interpreting broad constitutional principles
or balancing constitutional values needs to take into account the particular cultural and social setting
of the court more than uncertain notions of ‘international consensus.’”); Choudhry, supra note 395,
at 825–26 (1999) (asserting that there are three kinds of comparative constitutional interpretation:
universalist, which is premised on the assumption that constitutional principles arise from shared
universal norms; dialogical, which focuses on assumptions underlying constitutional jurisprudence
when determining whether or not to adopt the reasoning of foreign courts; and genealogical, which
is concerned with similarities in the historical backgrounds of constitutions).
400. See Annus, supra note 395, at 348–49.
401. See, e.g., id.
402. Examples of this sort of selective process abound in foreign courts. See, e.g., Joy v. Fed.
Territory Islamic Religious Council, [2007] 1 L.R.C. 1, 1–2 (Malaysia); Republic v. Fast Track
High Court, Accra, ex parte Comm’n on Human Rts. & Admin. Justice, [2009] 1 L.R.C. 44, 45
(Ghana) (citing a variety of international legal precedents in a case determining the jurisdiction of
the High Court of Ghana, including nine citations from the UK, two from South Africa, two from
Canada, and one from the US); see also Kirby, supra note 356, at 435–36 (noting the wealth of
reference to the law of other nations in cases from national courts engaged in comparative legal
analysis).
403. See, e.g., Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 228–29.
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foreign legal system. 404 To the contrary, it is the U.S. court that makes the
decision, and it implements it as a matter of domestic U.S. law.405 Foreign law
may have played a role in the decisional process, but the control of that process
rested at all times with the domestic U.S. court, which exercised its own legal
discretion and judgment in deciding how to resolve the matter in question.406
This is particularly true in situations where nations have joined in common
commitments to international treaties or conventions that embody a particular
set of legal principles. In those circumstances, typically the popularly elected
democratic arms of domestic government have formally acknowledged common
legal ground with other nations on the matters that are the subject of the
convention or treaty, and have committed their domestic governments to
adherence to the common principles.407 By doing so, they have given formal
domestic legal recognition to the foundations for comparative inquiry.408 What
those principles mean in the law of one adhering nation-state should, therefore,
have relevance for the understanding of what they mean in another.409
For these reasons, among others, the objections to wholesale exceptionalism
do not apply to a selective approach.410 Wholesale exceptionalism is neither
desirable nor particularly workable, and it risks certain pernicious
consequences.411 By setting a conclusive presumption against the use of foreign
or international law, it goes way too far. In contrast, selective exceptionalism,
through its active engagement with foreign and international sources, provides a
cogent and reasoned means for discerning the circumstances in which foreign
and international law are appropriately relevant, as well as the circumstances in
which they are not.412
B. Standards for Selective Exceptionalism
If selective exceptionalism is to comport with the rule of law, we need at least
a provisional set of relatively identifiable, objective, and consistently applicable
guidelines for determining when it is appropriately invoked. While it may not
be possible to offer a comprehensive set of criteria, there are at least four
potential sources from which it is possible to generate appropriate guidelines for
404. See id.
405. See, e.g., Rahdert supra note 44, at 606–07; Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 228–
29 (elaborating on the distinction between looking to foreign law in a decision and applying that
foreign law over American law).
406. See Volokh, Foreign Law, supra note 188, at 228–29.
407. See supra note 392.
408. See id.
409. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle
for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 430 (2001) (suggesting that the
changing nature of international intellectual property litigation “may herald a greater role for
comparative thought than intellectual property litigation would heretofore have provided”).
410. See supra notes 365–72 and accompanying text.
411. See, e.g., id.
412. See, e.g., id.
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selective exception: legal text, governmental structure, political institutions, and
legal tradition.
1. Legal Text
The most immediate and obvious guide to selective exceptionalism is
constitutional or statutory text. Where a domestic constitutional or statutory text
specifically declares its exceptional character, or where by its terms it differs in
some substantial and legally significant way from other constitutional or
statutory texts elsewhere on a commonly shared legal issue, that textual
difference is a potentially potent signal of an exceptionalist position.413 This is
particularly true if the text directly refers to some specific ground of exceptional
national experience, or if its historical milieu shows that its peculiarities of
language respond directly to such a national experience.414 Courts that openly
engage in comparative legal analysis typically exercise great care in exploring
textual differences in constitutional or statutory language and often rely on those
differences as a basis for distinguishing differences in legal interpretation.415
Particularly where those differences can be tied to deliberate constitutional or
legislative choices to diverge from an established international pattern, textual
variation of this sort can be a powerful indicator of exceptionalism.
An example in the U.S. system might well be the Second Amendment.416 In
District of Columbia v. Heller, 417 each of the two principal competing
interpretations of the Second Amendment treated it as deeply rooted in the U.S.
historical experience.418 The majority read the language of the Amendment’s
operative clause as triggering a distinct historically rooted U.S. right to possess
and carry (“keep and bear”) arms for purposes of self-defense and defense of
one’s property.419 The principal dissent read the language of the Amendment’s
prefatory clause (“well-regulated militia”) as referring to the unique U.S.
practice, during the early Republic, of allowing individuals to maintain arms for
purposes of military service.420 In both views, the language of the Amendment
drew upon U.S. practices and customs regarding personal use of arms that
arguably distinguished U.S. constitutional law on the question from the legal
rules and practices of other nations.421
413. Cf. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC) at para. 36.
414. Cf. id.
415. See id. (examining linguistic differences in foreign constitutional laws to determine
potential relevance to constitutionality of death penalty in South Africa).
416. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
417. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
418. Compare id. at 595 (majority opinion), with id. at 651–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
419. Id. at 595 (majority opinion) (concluding “on the basis of both text and history, that the
Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms”).
420. Id. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[w]hen each word in the text is given
full effect, the Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess
arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia”).
421. See id. at 593, 637.
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In this regard, the process used in Oklahoma and elsewhere to express the
state’s exceptionalist sentiments cannot be faulted. The best and most effective
way to establish an exceptionalist posture is to signal it directly in the language
of the relevant legal text, which is precisely what Oklahoma and other AFIL
states have done. The problem with these measures, aside from attempted
religious exceptionalism, is the categorical character of foreign law preclusion,
not the fact that they use explicit language to establish an exceptionalist norm.
If a political community wants to set itself apart on a matter of law, it is best to
be overt about it. The clearer the textual difference, the better the case is for
conscious legal differentiation in an exceptional direction.
Indeed, the capacity for explicit differentiation through constitutional or
statutory text is a strong antidote to the argument that any resort to foreign or
international law creates a “democratic deficit.”422 The gist of that argument is
that reliance on foreign law surrenders decisional authority to the foreign or
international source, which is not accountable to the people through democratic
processes.423 As long as judicial determinations that rely on foreign law are
subject to explicit textual correction through a democratic legislative or
constitutional process, there is no greater deficit in the case of using foreign or
international law than there is in any other kind of judicial decision.424

422. See Kirby, supra note 356, at 454–55.
There remains, however, the democratic deficit. This is an objection common to the
hesitation of U.S. and Australian jurists when analogies to the resolution of a municipal
law problem are propounded with reference to the principles of foreign or international
law as expressed in courts, tribunals, and other bodies outside the judicature of the nationstate.
Id.
423. See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1225 (2007).
Federal laws, whether they regulate citizens and states, or constrain the power that our
own executive actors would otherwise enjoy, go through an arduous process of
bicameralism and presentment that offers some guarantee of democratic control. By
contrast, international law has a severe democracy deficit. The more sweeping the claim
of authority for international law, the more pronounced the democracy deficit and the
more dubious the assertion that customary international law should override domestic
law.
Id.
424. See Harold Hongju Koh, A Community of Reason and Rights, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 583,
591 (2008).
[T]he argument goes, if judges place their fundamental values into the Constitution
through judicial interpretation, they effectively override the will of elected officials. But
there is a democratic deficit that judges face whether they are citing to international and
foreign law or whether they are just interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution to say that equal treatment does not mean separate but equal.
Id.
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2. Legal Structure
A second, more diffuse and hence more contestable, guide for selective
exceptionalism is legal structure. Any comparative law survey discloses areas
of both similarity and substantial difference in governmental structure among
different national governing systems.425 For example, there are many federalist
constitutional systems around the world, but examination reveals a fairly wide
range of structural differences in the construction of nation-state or nationprovince relations. 426 Typically, those differences grow out of important
differences in culture and history that affect both the way nation and state
authorities are defined and how they functionally interact.427 Thus, for example,
U.S. federalism reflects the historical fact that the 13 original states had separate
existence and possessed distinct sovereign identity before national union under
first the Articles of Confederation, and then the U.S. Constitution, occurred;
while Canadian federalism reflects, among other things, the distinct legal and
cultural traditions of its Anglophone and Francophone provinces.428 Although
one should not entirely rule out the possibility of shared ground over the
structure and function of federalism, legal decisions that are grounded in
federalism should leave considerable room for national divergence that reflects
the peculiarities of a particular society’s view of the appropriate vertical
distribution of governmental powers.429
3. Political Institutions
A third possible source for selective exception is the identification of unique
political institutions that perform distinctive governmental functions within a
particular governmental system. Where a nation’s legal system includes an
institution that other governments do not share, the operation of that institution
will necessarily take on an exceptional character. An example in the United

425. See Lee Peoples, Comparative Law Methodology and Sources, OKLA. CITY UNIV. LAW
LIBR. (2005), www2.okcu.edu/law/lawlib/pdfs/guide_comparative.pdf (listing the several types of
comparative studies employed).
426. See generally Craig Volden, Origin, Operation, and Significance: The Federalism of
William H. Riker, 34 PUBLIUS: J. OF FEDERALISM, 89, 90–91 (2004); Daniel J. Elazar, Contrasting
Unity and Federal Systems, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 237, 238-39 (1997).
427. See Volden, supra note 426, at 91–95 (describing the different ways that federalist
systems originate).
428. Ellis Katz, American Federalism, Past, Present and Future, U.S. INFORMATION
SERVICE’S ELECTRONIC J. (April 1997), http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~ras2777/amgov/
federalism.html; Jay Makarenko, Federalism in Canada: Basic Framework and Operation,
MAPLELEAFWEB (Jan. 11, 2008), http://mapleleafweb.com/features/federalism-canada-basicframework-and-operation.
429. The tendency of federalist structures to reflect unique historical and cultural patterns may
lie behind the Supreme Court’s refusal, in Printz v. United States, to countenance the comparative
arguments made by Justice Breyer in his dissent regarding patterns of vertical law enforcement
integration followed in other federal systems. 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11, 976–78 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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States is the Electoral College, the unusual, and rather arcane, system that is used
to select the President.430 It is doubtful that there are any textual or structural
cognates in other constitutional democracies that would provide useful grounds
for comparative reasoning about the formation and operation of the Electoral
College, and it is doubtful that it would be appropriate, or for that matter,
particularly helpful, for a U.S. court to look abroad for guidance in interpreting
the constitutional rules governing Electoral College procedures. The United
States might well look to foreign or international precedent in deciding whether
and how to amend the Electoral College provisions of our constitution, but as
long as they are there, figuring out how they work is necessarily an exclusive
domestic undertaking.431
4. Legal Tradition
Once one presses beyond text, structure, and unique political institutions, the
grounds for selective exceptionalism become far more difficult to articulate, and
the dangers of arbitrary or result-oriented exceptionalism increase substantially.
Yet there is probably a fourth basis for legitimate exceptionalist claims that is
grounded in a longstanding distinctive legal tradition and deeply rooted in a
unique national culture. This option, however, must be narrowly crafted in order
to protect against the dangers of overly easy and overly inclusive assertion. This
Article suggests six limiting criteria. At a minimum, the tradition should to be
one which produces: (1) a clearly articulated exceptional principle; (2) that is
reflected in a broad array of legal sources; (3) over a substantial period of
national history; (4) showing a demonstrably unique response; (5) to a particular
social issue; and (6) one that is deeply rooted in individuating national
experience. This should not be an easy standard to satisfy, and the burden should
be on the party or court relying on exceptionalism to demonstrate its existence.
One example in the United States would be the tradition of separation of
church and state referred to above. 432 The concept of religious nonestablishment is by no means unique to the United States. Many other
constitutional democracies prohibit the state from legislating on religious
matters or overtly preferring a particular religious denomination as the
established church.433 Thus there is little that is textually or structurally distinct
430. AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE: STEPS IN CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT 10–15 (American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Walter Berns, ed. 1983).
431. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–14 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(discussing constitutional and statutory rules governing operation of Electoral College).
432. See, e.g., McCreary City. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 244–45 (1982).
433. See, e.g., AUSTL. CONST. s. 116 (“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for
establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or
public trust under the Commonwealth”); Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“The State and the
Catholic Church are independent and sovereign, each within its own sphere.”); CONST. (1987), art.
III, sec. 5 (Phil.) (“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
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about the U.S. constitutional command. Nevertheless, for the reasons alluded to
above, the U.S. commitment to church-state separation is uniquely strong, and it
has produced a jurisprudential tradition that arguably stands apart from law on
similar questions in other countries. It readily satisfies the six criteria for
exception advanced above.434
Another example might be U.S. attitudes toward personal bodily autonomy,
which support a particularly strong notion of the rights of individuals to make
basic medical decisions, including refusal of medically necessary forms of
treatment.435 The right has an acknowledged constitutional dimension,436 but it
also has roots in an exceptionally strong commitment to common-law principles
of personal bodily autonomy and self-determination.437 It may also reflect deepseated U.S. libertarian instincts about the limits of governmental competence to
make highly personal health care decisions.438 While some other constitutional
democracies might share similar commitments, there are good reasons to believe
that U.S. law on this subject has developed, and will continue to develop, a
distinctly U.S. trajectory that allows for greater personal bodily autonomy than
many other legal systems would be willing to tolerate.439 Here, nations may
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights”); TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI MADDE 10 (Turkey) (the
founding principles of the Republic of Turkey are secularism, social equality, and equality before
law).
434. See supra Section III.B.4.
435. Mary Ann Baily, Futility, Autonomy, and Cost in End-of-Life Care, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 172, 172 (2011) (“In decisions to forego medical treatment, autonomy is basic. A mentally
competent adult patient has a close to absolute moral and legal right to refuse treatment”).
436. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (assuming that principles
of due process extend to medical patients, an autonomous right to refuse medical treatment exists).
437. Id. at 269.
Before the turn of the century, this Court observed that ‘[n]o right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’
Id. (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
438. E.g., Baily, supra note 435, at 172–73.
439. See Naoki Kanaboshi, Competent Persons’ Constitutional Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment in the U.S. and Japan: Application to Japanese Law, 25 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 5, 6
(2006) (exploring the scope of the right to refuse medical treatment in the United States and arguing
that, despite contrary current interpretations of Japanese law, the principles applied in the United
States should be incorporated into Japanese law and protected by the Japanese Constitution.). Other
nations have pressed further than the United States on some issues; see, e.g., Nurit Lev, The
Legalization of Euthanasia: The Right to Die or the Duty to Die?, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 297, 297 (1995) (comparing “judicial and legislative attempts to define the legal status of
euthanasia in the Netherlands, the first nation to sanction euthanasia, with the United States where
momentum is growing for the legislation of physician-assisted suicide.”); see also Jennfier Fischer,
A Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse Treatment for Involuntarily Hospitalized Persons with
a Mental Illness, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 154 (comparing “how various countries
and regions around the world have come out on the debate”).
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share common commitments, but in the language of the European courts there
must be a fairly wide “margin of appreciation” that allows divergence in the
legal expression of a shared norm.440 Where a nation finds itself at one end or
another of the spectrum, it may conclude with some justice that the laws and
legal decisions of other nations are unlikely to be of much use.
Consideration of exceptionalism based on legal tradition, however, highlights
one of the key differences between selective and categorical exceptionalism.
Under a selective approach, one must make a specific affirmative case for
exception, and one must press the exception only as far as that case warrants.
Thus, in the example of medical decision-making, the extent to which foreign or
international law would be relevant should depend on an assessment of the
relative strength or weakness of another legal system’s commitment to
autonomous medical decision-making in the context of its own system for
providing health care. The same would be true for matters of church-state
relations. Some foreign sources might be excluded from consideration, but not
necessarily all. Some specific issues might be stronger candidates for
exceptional treatment than others. Under this approach, exceptionalism does not
rule out consideration of foreign or international sources, but it does potentially
limit which sources may be used, the extent to which they can be used, and the
purposes for which their use is appropriate.
C. The Values of Dialogue and Engagement
What links all four proposed sources for selective exceptionalism, and
distinguishes them all from the wholesale sort of exceptionalism reflected in
most AFIL measures, is their collective commitment to dialogic interaction with
foreign and international sources. A selective approach does not reject foreign
or international sources outright, but rather requires them to be considered, at
least at a preliminary level, in order to determine whether they have relevance
and, if so, to what degree. Selectivity also requires making an affirmative case
for deliberate differentiation between domestic and international or foreign
norms, principles, and rules. Selectivity, in other words, invites edifying
discourse on the relation between domestic law and potential foreign or
international counterparts. It engages with foreign law, without necessarily
accepting the relevance of foreign law in all cases. It burdens a domestic
adjudicator with the symmetrical responsibility to articulate a basis for either
considering foreign and international sources, or excluding them. In either

440. The “margin of appreciation” doctrine, articulated in Handyside v. U.K., 24 Eur. Ct. H.
R. (ser. A) para. 48 (1976), allows the European Court of Human Rights to take into account varying
interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights in different member states due to
cultural, historic and philosophical differences among member states. See Emily Wada, A Pretty
Picture: The Margin of Appreciation and the Right to Assisted Suicide, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 275 (discussing implicit use of the margin of appreciation in Pretty v. United
Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155 which upheld states’ authority to prohibit assisted suicide).
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direction, this sort of dialogic engagement can be both edifying and illuminating
for the development of domestic law.441
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, AFIL statutes are unlikely to have much success in stemming the
tide of legal globalization. As the twenty-first century unfolds, patterns of
economic and social interaction across national boundaries will force
progressive internationalization and globalization of law.442 If state courts are
obliged to remain inhospitable to those developments, the parties whose
economic and social needs dictate advancing globalization will find ways to
navigate around the shoals of the AFIL restrictions. The current spate of AFIL
proposals may well reflect a kind of political nostalgia for a simpler time when
sources of law were less complicated and courts did not need to think beyond
local boundaries on any but a handful of legal questions. As noted above, that
nostalgia may rest partly on a misreading of legal history.443 But even if things
were once that way, the AFIL movement is inconsistent with a present and future
in which even the most ordinary kinds of legal practice are acquiring globalized
character. 444 In the globalized legal world that is upon us, there is still
441. Jackson, supra note 362, at 114.
[C]onstitutional law can be understood as a site of engagement between domestic law
and international or foreign legal sources and practices. On this view, the constitution’s
interpreters do not treat foreign or international material as binding, or as presumptively
to be followed. But neither do they put on blinders that exclude foreign legal sources
and experience. Transnational sources are seen as interlocutors, offering a way of testing
understanding of one’s own traditions by examining them in the reflection of others.’
Id.; Koh, supra note 229, at 56.
Through a time-honored dialogic process, litigants, activists, publicists, and academic
commentators seek to inform, influence, and improve this kind of judicial decision
making. . . . it is precisely through this transnational legal process that interlinked rules of
domestic and international law develop, and that interlinked processes of domestic and
international compliance come about.
Id.; Choudhry supra note 395, at 837.
Comprehending a foreign legal system as being organized around a core set of normative
and factual assumptions leads to a deeper understanding of that system. But it also
furthers legal self-understanding, because it invites the comparative lawyer, or the judge,
to compare those assumptions against the assumptions that legal doctrine in her own
system both reflects and constitutes.
Id.
442. See Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. INT’L L.J.
985, 988 (2009) (concluding that, “because the globalization of domestic constitutional law is
inevitable, notions of separation of powers – or of legislative supremacy qualified by the existence
of judicial review – will need to accommodate themselves to that globalization.”); David S. Law,
Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277 (2008); Martin
Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993).
443. See supra note 95.
444. Susan L. DeJarnatt & Mark C. Rahdert, Preparing for the Globalized Law Practice: The
Need to Include International and Comparative Law in the Legal Writing Curriculum, Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2010-10, 23–24 (2010) (citing survey of
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substantial room for a carefully calibrated and articulated selective legal
exceptionalism of the kind this Article has described.445 At least there should be
some room for selective exceptionalism, because there is value in national legal
diversity. But efforts at categorical exceptionalism like the Oklahoma SOS
Amendment and its AFIL progeny are ultimately undesirable, artificial barriers
to proper selective resort to the teachings of international and foreign law.

Philadelphia Bar Association members in which 67.5% of respondents “reported that they had
worked on a legal matter that required them to know something about foreign and/or international
law.”).
445. See generally Koh, supra note 229.
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